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Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084433

Gathering Information before Signing a Contract: Experimental Evidence

Hoppe, Eva I; Schmitz, Patrick W - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

report about an experiment with 508 participants designed to test whether this fundamental trade-off is actually relevant. In …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789080

Incentive Compatible Reimbursement Schemes for Physicians

Emons, Winand - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

We consider physicians with fixed capacity levels. If a physician's capacity exceeds demand, she may have an incentive to overtreat, i.e., she may provide unnecessary treatments to use up idle capacity. By contrast, with excess demand she may undertreat, i.e., she may not provide necessary...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468555

Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper studies the consequences of price discrimination in a market for experts’ services. In the case of experts markets, where the expert observes the intervention that a consumer needs to fix his problem and also provides a treatment, price discrimination proceeds along the dimension of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504480

Credence Goods, Costly Diagnosis, and Subjective Evaluation

Bester, Helmut; Dahm, Matthias - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study contracting between a consumer and an expert. The expert can invest in diagnosis to obtain a noisy signal about whether a low-cost service is sufficient or whether a high-cost treatment is required to solve the consumer’s problem. This involves moral hazard because diagnosis effort...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084241

Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper studies price competition between experts and discounters in a market for credence goods. While experts can identify a consumer's problem by exerting costly but unobservable diagnosis effort, discounters just sell treatments without giving any advice. The unobservability of diagnosis...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792449

On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

In recent years various contributions have analyzed the credence goods problem under a wide variety of assumptions yielding equilibria exhibiting various degrees of inefficiencies and fraud. The variety of results has fostered the impression that the equilibrium behaviour of experts and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791194

Tailored Bayesian Mechanisms: Experimental Evidence from Two-Stage Voting Games

Engelmann, Dirk; Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

Optimal voting rules have to be adjusted to the underlying distribution of preferences. However, in practice there usually is no social planner who can perform this task. This paper shows that the introduction of a stage at which agents may themselves choose voting rules according to which they...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084169

(In)Transparency of Information Acquisition: A Bargaining Experiment

Gehrig, Thomas; Güth, Werner; Levínsky, René - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We analyze how transparency affects information acquisition in a bargaining context, where proposers may chose to purchase information about the unknown outside option of their bargaining partner. Although information acquisition is excessive in all our scenarios we find that the bargaining...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666562

You Owe Me

Malmendier, Ulrike M.; Schmidt, Klaus M. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

In many cultures and industries gifts are given in order to influence the recipient, often at the expense of a third … party. Examples include business gifts of firms and lobbyists. In a series of experiments, we show that, even without … incentive or in-formational effects, small gifts strongly influence the recipient’s behavior in favor of the gift giver, in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083305

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