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Bulow, Jeremy I.; Huang, Ming; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

Part ownership of a takeover target can help a bidder win a takeover auction, often at a low price. A bidder with a ‘toehold’ bids aggressively in a standard ascending auction because its offers are both bids for the remaining shares and asks for its own holdings. While the direct effect of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136550

On the Incentive Problems in Financial Conglomerates

Lóránth, Gyöngyi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This paper analyses the effects of scope expansion on the core activity of banks and provides a rationale for their interest in offering a wider product range. We show that scope economies may stem from moral hazard in the core business, and argue that a cost of scope expansion might be the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791861

Equity Block Transfers in Transition Economies: Evidence from Poland

Trojanowski, Grzegorz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper investigates valuation effects of share block transfers and employs agency theory to explain the determinants of block premia. A sample of transactions from Poland is used to measure benefits and costs of ownership concentration. Block premia are found to be substantially lower than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124379

The Timing of Takeovers in Growing and Declining Markets

Mason, Robin; Weeds, Helen - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010

Empirical studies have found that takeover activity is positively related to the absolute size of industry-level shocks. In this paper we develop a dynamic framework to analyze the timing of takeover which explains this pattern. Takeover may create value either by exploiting synergies or through...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468572

The Impact of Horizontal Mergers on Rivals: Gains to Being Left Outside a Merger

Clougherty, Joseph A.; Duso, Tomaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

that it is beneficial to be a non-merging rival firm to a large horizontal merger. Using a sample of mergers with expert …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123810

Why Mergers Reduce Profits, and Raise Share-Prices

Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Stennek, Johan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

We explain the empirical puzzle why mergers reduce profits, and raise share prices. If being an 'insider' is better …, since the risk of becoming an outsider is eliminated. We also show that mergers increasing consumers' prices, while …-competitive mergers. These results are derived in an endogenous-merger model, predicting the conditions under which mergers occur, the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504698

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

predicts the frequency of mergers and acquisitions to be negatively correlated with employment protection. These predictions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666907

Political Connections and Firm Value: Evidence from the Regression Discontinuity Design of Close Gubernatorial Elections

Do, Quoc-Anh; Lee, Yen-Teik; Nguyen, Bang Dang - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372

Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation

Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock-based incentives elicit not only productive effort, but also costly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567

Takeover Bids versus Proxy Fights in Contests for Corporate Control

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Hart, Oliver - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

This Paper evaluates the primary mechanisms for changing management or obtaining control in publicly traded corporations with dispersed ownership. Specifically, we analyse and compare three mechanisms: (1) proxy fights (voting only); (2) takeover bids (buying shares only); and (3) a combination...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123692

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