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Sabotage in Tournaments: Making the Beautiful Game a Bit Less Beautiful
Garicano, Luis; Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We exploit an incentive change in professional soccer leagues aimed at encouraging more attacking and goal scoring to obtain evidence on the effect of stronger incentives on productive and destructive effort. Using as control the behavior of the same teams in a competition that experienced no...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114301
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Team Incentives: Evidence from a Firm Level Experiment
Bandiera, Oriana; Barankay, Iwan; Rasul, Imran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
composition. We present evidence from a field experiment designed to evaluate the impact of rank incentives and tournaments on the … productivity and composition of teams. Strengthening incentives, either through rankings or tournaments, makes workers more likely … incentives only reduce the productivity of teams at the bottom of the productivity distribution, and monetary prize tournaments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083724
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Incentives Versus Sorting in Tournaments: Evidence from a Field Experiment
Leuven, Edwin; Oosterbeek, Hessel; Sonnemans, Joep; van … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
A vast body of empirical studies lends support to the incentive effects of rank-order tournaments. Evidence comes from … tournaments may bias these non-experimental studies, whereas short task duration or lack of distracters may limit the external … where students selected themselves into tournaments with different prizes. Within each tournament the best performing …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136509
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Transparency, Appropriability and the Early State
Mayshar, Joram; Moav, Omer; Neeman, Zvika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We propose a general theory that explains the extent of the state and accounts for related institutions as byproducts of the state's extractive technology. We posit further that this extractive technology is determined by the transparency of the production technology. This theory is applied to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009283392
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Geography, Transparency and Institutions
Mayshar, Joram; Moav, Omer; Neeman, Zvika - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We propose a theory by which geographic variations in the transparency of the production process explain cross-regional differences in the scale of the state, in its hierarchical structure, and in property rights over land. The key linkage between geography and these institutions, we posit, is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083761
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Premise-Based versus Outcome-Based Information Aggregation
de Clippel, Geoffroy; Eliaz, Kfir - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
A group of rational individuals with common interest need to select one of two outcomes. The optimal decision depends on whether certain premises or pieces of evidence are established as being true, and each member receives a noisy signal of the truth value of the relevant premises. Should the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083847
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Optimal Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection
Philippon, Thomas; Skreta, Vasiliki - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We study interventions to restore efficient lending and investment when financial markets fail because of adverse selection. We solve a design problem where the decision to participate in a program offered by the government can be a signal for private information. We charac terize optimal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468692
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Optimal Debt Contracts under Costly Enforcement
Hvide, Hans K; Leite, Tore - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
We consider a financing game with costly enforcement based on Townsend (1979), but where monitoring is non-contractible and allowed to be stochastic. Debt is the optimal contract. Moreover, the debt contract induces creditor leniency and strategic defaults by the borrower on the equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498123
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Information Aggregation, Investment, and Managerial Incentives
Albagli, Elias; Hellwig, Christian; Tsyvinski, Aleh - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We study the interplay of share prices and firm decisions when share prices aggregate and convey noisy information about fundamentals to investors and managers. First, we show that the informational feedback between the firm's share price and its investment decisions leads to a systematic...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009275969
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No margin, no mission? A Field Experiment on Incentives for Pro-Social Tasks
Ashraf, Nava; Bandiera, Oriana; Jack, Kelsey - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012
A substantial body of research investigates the design of incentives in firms, yet less is known about incentives in organizations that hire individuals to perform tasks with positive social spillovers. We conduct a field experiment in which agents hired by a public health organization are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083234