consistent with the general notion that competition mitigates managerial agency problems, our results are, in particular … competitive industries. When we examine which agency problem competition mitigates, we find evidence consistent with a “quiet …

governance, while firms in non-competitive industries--where lack of competitive pressure fails to enforce discipline on managers … performance, we consistently find the same pattern: The effect is monotonic in the degree of competition, it is small and …

I characterize the effects of empirically observed managerial incentives on long-run oligopolistic competition. When … managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing … termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …

increase further in the future. Our findings have significant implications for corporate governance, regulatory competition …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

; corporate governance; market structures and competition; and financial constraints. We conclude that private ownership and …

In this Paper we analyse the impact of product market competition and ownership structure on corporate performance. We … the separate effects of competition and ownership concentration on firm level productivity growth. Next, we investigate … bias that could affect the productivity levels and productivity growth. Our results show that product market competition …

This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …