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Does the market choose optimal health insurance coverage?
Boone, Jan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Consumers, when buying health insurance, do not know the exact value of each treatment that they buy coverage for. This leads them to overvalue some treatments and undervalue others. We show that the insurance market cannot correct these mistakes. This causes research labs to overinvest in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084438
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A Theory of Immigration Amnesties
Epstein, Gil S; Weiss, Avi - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This paper presents a first attempt at understanding some of the many issues involved in the granting of an amnesty to illegal immigrants. We consider government behavior with respect to allocations on limiting infiltration (border control) and apprehending infiltrators (internal control) and,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504554
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Illegal immigration and media exposure: Evidence on individual attitudes
Facchini, Giovanni; Mayda, Anna Maria; Puglisi, Riccardo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Illegal immigration has been the focus of much debate in receiving countries, but little is known about what drives individual attitudes towards illegal immigrants. To study this question, we use the CCES survey, which was carried out in 2006 in the United States. We find evidence that - in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008557005
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The rhetoric of closed borders: quotas, lax enforcement and illegal migration
Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
Despite restrictive migration policies, large numbers of undocumented migrants reside in many destination countries. If … with uncertainty on the migrants' supply, where an elected official can either have preferences congruent with the median … voter, or prefer a larger number of migrants. We show that, if the incumbent prefers more migrants than the median, he might …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854513
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The Samaritan’s Dilemma and public health insurance
Sepulveda, Facundo - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 2006
When the government cannot commit to withdraw from providing charity health care, as is the case when it faces the Samaritan's Dilemma, a pub- lic health insurance scheme can be Pareto improving. However, the large heterogeneity in the design of such schemes observed around the world begs the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004971312
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Competition leverage: how the demand side affects optimal risk adjustment
Bijlsma, Michiel; Boone, Jan; Zwart, Gijsbert - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011
We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009144733
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Insurance Search and Switching Behavior
Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper looks into the search behavior of consumers in the market for health insurance contracts. We consider the recent health insurance reform in The Netherlands, where a private-public mix of insurance provision was replaced by a system based on managed competition. Although all insurers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008466330
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The Labor-Supply Effects of Universal Health Coverage: What Can We Learn form Individuals with Coverage Through Their Spouses?
Wellington, A.J.; Codd-Clark, D. - Research School of Economics, College of Business and … - 1995
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004967989
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Facilitating Consumer Learning in Insurance Markets—What Are the Welfare Effects?
Lagerlöf, Johan N. M.; Schottmüller, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
What are the welfare effects of a policy that facilitates for insurance customers to privately and covertly learn about their accident risks? We endogenize the information structure in Stiglitz's classic monopoly insurance model. We first show that his results are robust: For a small information...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083449
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Private, social and self-insurance for long-term care in the presence of family help: A political economy analysis
De Donder, Philippe; Pestieau, Pierre - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
We study the political determination of the level of social long-term care insurance when voters also choose private insurance and saving amounts. Agents differ in income, probability of becoming dependent and of receiving family help. Social insurance redistributes across income and risk...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083512