Showing 1 - 10 of 517
We examine strategic information transmission in a controlled laboratory experiment of a cheap talk game with one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784698
We design an experiment to study the effects of social identity on preferences over redistribution. The experiment …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114256
This paper studies the effects that the revelation of information on the electorate's preferences has on voters' turnout decisions. The experimental data show that closeness in the division of preferences induces a significant increase in turnout. Moreover, for closely divided electorates (and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661831
, asymmetric information induces a universal protectionist bias. The structure of protection is Pareto inefficient, in contrast to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399721
I develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained (yet individually rational) distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets. In processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education, health insurance, pensions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662410
I develop a model of rent seeking with informational foundations and an arbitrary number of rent seekers, and I compare the results with Tullock's (1980) classic model where the influence activities are "black-boxed." Given the microfoundations, the welfare consequences of rent seeking can be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788985
I develop a model of group decision-making, in which a committee generates proposals and holds open discussions, but the ultimate decision is either taken by a leader (decision by authority) or by majority vote. Optimal communication processes are studied that combine both cheap talk statements...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792030
We show that in democracies insufficient recognition of general equilibrium effects can lead to a crisis. We consider a two-sector economy in which a majoritarian political process determines governmental regulation in one sector: a minimum nominal wage. If voters recognize general equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504724
We present a dynamic model of sequential information acquisition by a heterogeneous committee. At each date agents decide whether to vote to adopt one of two alternatives or continue to collect more information. The process stops when a qualified majority vote for an alternative. Three main...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011196032
This paper studies the corporate governance and asset pricing implications of investors owning blocks in multiple firms. Common wisdom is that multi-firm ownership weakens governance because the blockholder is spread too thinly. We show that this need not be the case. In a single-firm benchmark,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084086