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The Structure of Corporate ownership in Privatized Utilities
Trillas, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
shareholder dispersion that are higher than in the benchmark case. Collusion with large shareholders, however, may yield higher …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123598
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Why is hedge fund activism procyclical?
Burkart, Mike; Dasgupta, Amil - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
for shareholders and bondholders. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084491
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Liquidity and Governance
Back, Kerry E.; Li, Tao; Ljungqvist, Alexander P. - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013
Is greater trading liquidity good or bad for corporate governance? We address this question both theoretically and empirically. We solve a model consisting of an optimal IPO followed by a dynamic Kyle market in which the large investor's private information concerns her own plans for taking an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084717
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The Corporate Governance of Defined-Benefit Pension Plans: Evidence from the United Kingdom
Cocco, Joâo Francisco P.D.; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
shareholders of the sponsoring company, and not necessarily pension plan members. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792367
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The Macroeconomics of Shareholder Pressure
Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
This Paper argues that shareholder activism can be considered as similar to the adoption of increasing returns-to-scale technology by financial institutions. I start from this mechanism to build a model designed to assess the long-run consequences of shareholder pressure. I then use this model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661545
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper develops an account of the role and significance of managerial power and rent extraction in executive … power approach suggests that boards do not operate at arm’s length in devising executive compensation arrangements; rather …, executives have power to influence their own pay, and they use that power to extract rents. Furthermore, the desire to camouflage …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
This Paper provides an overview of the main theoretical elements and empirical underpinnings of a ‘managerial power … instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … show that the managerial power approach can explain many features of the executive compensation landscape, including ones …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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Investment Banks as Insiders and the Market for Corporate Control
Bodnaruk, Andriy; Massa, Massimo; Simonov, Andrei - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We study holdings in M&A targets by financial conglomerates which affiliated investment banks advise the bidders. We show that advisors take positions in the targets before M&A announcements. These stakes are positively related to the probability of observing the bid and to the target premium....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123703
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Corporate Governance and Value Creation: Evidence from Private Equity
Acharya, Viral V; Hahn, Moritz; Kehoe, Conor - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We examine deal-level data on private equity transactions in the UK initiated during the period 1996 to 2004 by mature private equity houses. We un-lever the deal-level equity return and adjust for (un-levered) return to quoted peers to extract a measure of "alpha" or abnormal performance of the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980202
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Incentives and the Management of Enterprises in Economic Transition: Capital Markets Are Not Enough
Mayhew, Ken; Seabright, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1992
This paper examines the changing incentives for the efficient management of firms in Eastern Europe. It contrasts the internal constitution of the firm (its governance and reward structures) with the various constraints imposed on the firm's activities by external conditions in capital, labour...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124125