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and applications include political groups, ethnicities, agents motivated by the work in the public sector and corruption … that patronage may be strictly positive in both of them. We also apply the second setting to the case of corruption. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011145475
This paper studies the relationship between fiscal decentralization and electoral accountability, by analysing how decentralization impacts upon incentive and selection effects, and thus on voter welfare. The model abstracts from features such as public good spillovers or economies of scale, so...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504327
There has been a dramatic change in the division of responsibility between the state and the private sector for the delivery of public goods and services in recent years with an increasing trend towards contracting out to the private sector and ‘public-private partnerships’. This Paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661980
Using the regression discontinuity design of close gubernatorial elections in the U.S., we identify a significant and positive impact of the social networks of corporate directors and politicians on firm value. Firms connected to elected governors increase their value by 3.89%. Political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011249372
The paper studies the effect of additional government revenues on political corruption and on the quality of … implications of the theory and identify the causal effect of larger federal transfers on political corruption and the observed … transfers increase political corruption and reduce the quality of candidates for mayor. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468543
. We show that corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time. However, centralization … makes more difficult for citizens to detect corrupt incumbents. Thus, corruption is easier under centralization for low …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468714
We study the emergence and interaction of red tape and corruption in a principal-bureaucrat-agent hierarchy. The … the social optimum if the bureaucrat in charge of red tape is corrupt. We consider two types of corruption. First, the … bribes to conceal the information produced through red tape. The former kind of corruption tends to reduce red tape, while …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123811
enforcers - on sequential, bilateral, illegal transactions such as corruption, manager-auditor collusion, or drug deals. It is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124229
losses created by corruption. For each level of externalities, we find that high and low levels of corruption create … qualitatively different distortions, which in turn changes the nature and reach of optimal policies. Under low levels of corruption … the first best allocation. When externalities and corruption are above a threshold, only a second best allocation can be …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005032856
and decreasing in officials' corruption. In contrast to the "tollbooth view" of regulation, the standard chosen by a self …-interested government is a non-monotonic function of officials' corruption, and can be either lower or higher than that chosen by a …-capita income, and negatively with corruption, consistently with the model's predictions for benevolent governments …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504469