We model the interaction between two economies where banks exhibit both adverse selection and moral hazard and bank … regulators try to resolve these problems. We find that liberalizing bank capital flows between economies reduces total welfare by … considerations arise in this context. Allowing multinationals improves welfare when bank capital can flow across borders, despite the …

A bank’s interest expenses are found to increase with its degree of internationalization as proxied by its share of … bank is performing badly. Our benchmark estimation suggests that an international bank’s cost of funds raised through a … foreign subsidiary is between 1.5% and 2.4% higher than the cost of funds for a purely domestic bank, which is a sizeable …

ratios - following intra- and (particularly) interstate liberalization of bank branching restrictions. This effect arises …

This paper analyses cooperation among national supervisors in the decision to close a multinational bank. The …; (2) the more aligned national interests are, the higher is welfare resulting from the closure decision; (3) the bank can …

(particularly) interstate liberalization of bank branching restrictions. This effect arises primarily from convergence in the …

foreigners. We use a bank-level panel data set spanning all British and foreign banks providing loans within the United Kingdom …," domestic (British) loans of a bank expressed as a fraction of its total loan activity. We also study effective short …

bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity and monitors too little. A … central bank can alleviate the liquidity problem, but induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce an additional authority … that is able to bail out the bank either by injecting capital at a fixed return or by receiving an equity claim. This …

We analyse the implications for the pricing of bank loans of the reform of capital regulation known as Basel II. We …-sensitive standardized approach of Basel II. We also show that only an extremely high social cost of bank failure might justify the proposed …

. Using a model of a systemic bank suffering from liquidity shocks, we find that the unregulated bank keeps too much liquidity … induces moral hazard. Therefore, we introduce a fiscal authority that is able to bail out the bank by injecting capital. This …

liability of banks and the presence of a negative externality of one bank’s failure on the health of other banks give rise to a … risk. Regulatory mechanisms such as bank closure policy and capital adequacy requirements that are commonly based only on a … bank’s own risk fail to mitigate aggregate risk-shifting incentives, and can, in fact, accentuate systemic risk. Prudential …