Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 226
Cover Image
Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
Cover Image
Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
Cover Image
Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
Cover Image
Agency Conflicts, Ownership Concentration, and Legal Shareholder Protection
Burkart, Mike; Panunzi, Fausto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper analyses the interaction between legal shareholder protection, managerial incentives, and ownership concentration. In our framework, blockholder and manager are distinct parties and the presence of a blockholder can both protect and hurt minority shareholders. Legal shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662105
Cover Image
The Determinants of Privatized Enterprise Performance in Russia
Angelucci, Manuela; Bevan, Alan; Estrin, Saul; Fennema, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
Using data from a large enterprise-level panel designed to address this issue, we account for enterprise performance in Russia. We link performance to four aspects of the economic environment outlined in the literature: enterprise ownership; corporate governance; market structures and competition;...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666814
Cover Image
The Political Economy of Corporate Governance
Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
The Paper analyses the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that entrepreneurs and workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. This ‘corporatist’ agreement is feasible if the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666907
Cover Image
Ownership, Capital or Outsourcing: What Drives German Investment to Eastern Europe?
Lorentowicz, Andzelika; Marin, Dalia; Raubold, Alexander - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
The Paper takes a first look at the host and home country effects of German foreign direct investment (FDI) in Eastern Europe based on new survey data of 1050 investment projects in Eastern Europe by 420 German multinationals during the 1990s. We find that German investors transfer a substantial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666929
Cover Image
The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance
Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labour rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667054
Cover Image
Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics
Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789093
Cover Image
Rhineland Exit?
Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
We argue in favour of the shareholder model of the firm for three main reasons. First, serving multiple stakeholders leads to ill-defined property rights. What sounds like a fair compromise between stakeholders can easily evolve in a permanent struggle about the ultimate goal of the company....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791558