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Participation Games: Market Entry, Coordination and the Beautiful Blonde
Anderson, Simon P; Engers, Maxim - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
. Examples include market entry games, coordination games, and the bar-room game depicted in the movie 'A Beautiful Mind'. The …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662078
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Network Structure and Strategic Investments: An Experimental Analysis
Rosenkranz, Stephanie; Weitzel, Utz - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
play in networks is to some extent boundedly rational, in the sense that coordination is influenced by local and individual …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136539
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Communication, Renegotiation, and the Scope for Collusion
Cooper, David J.; Kühn, Kai-Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We use experiments to analyze what type of communication is most effective in achieving cooperation in a simple … collusion game. Consistent with the existing literature on communication and collusion, even minimal communication leads to a … strategies, this initial burst of collusion rapidly collapses. When unlimited pre-game communication is allowed via a chat window …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008558586
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The Politics of Compromise
Bonatti, Alessandro; Rantakari, Heikki - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
A team must select among competing projects that differ in their payoff consequences for its members. Each agent chooses a project and exerts costly effort affecting its random completion time. When one or more projects are complete, agents bargain over which one to implement. A consensus...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083881
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Coordination and Lock-In: Competition with Switching Costs and Network Effects
Farrell, Joseph; Klemperer, Paul - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Switching costs and network effects bind customers to vendors if products are incompatible, locking customers or even markets in to early choices. Lock-in hinders customers from changing suppliers in response to (predictable or unpredictable) changes in efficiency, and gives vendors lucrative ex...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124423
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Naked exclusion: Towards a behavioral approach to exclusive dealing
Boone, Jan; Müller, Wieland; Suetens, Sigrid - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
We report experimental results on exclusive dealing inspired by the literature on "naked exclusion.'' Our key findings are: First, exclusion of a more efficient entrant is a widespread phenomenon in lab markets. Second, allowing incumbents to discriminate between buyers increases exclusion rates...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004991543
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Brothers in Alms? Coordination between NGOs on Markets for Development Donations
Aldashev, Gani; Marini, Marco; Verdier, Thierry - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
This paper studies the stability of coordination between mission-driven non-governmental organizations (NGOs) competing … coordination under two classes of alliance-formation rules: unanimity and aggregative. If fundraising activities are strategic … complements, the grandcoalition (i.e. full coordination) is always individually stable and, under the unanimity rule …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784769
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X-Games
Eliaz, Kfir; Spiegler, Ran - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014
What is common to the following situations: incentivizing collective action in the presence of social preferences, monopoly pricing when consumers are loss averse, arms races when players are privately informed of their armament costs? We present a simple formalism, called X-games, which unifies...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084519
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It's All About Connections: Evidence on Network Formation
Falk, Armin; Kosfeld, Michael - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
We present an economic experiment on network formation, in which subjects can decide to form links to one another. Direct links are costly but being connected is valuable. The game-theoretic basis for our experiment is the model of Bala and Goyal (2000). They distinguish between two scenarios...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792485
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Equilibria in a Dynamic Global Game: The Role of Cohort Effects
Heidhues, Paul; Melissas, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005
We introduce strategic waiting in a global game setting with irreversible investment. Players can wait in order to make a better informed decision. We allow for cohort effects and discuss when they arise endogenously in technology adoption problems with positive contemporaneous network effects....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666707