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Biais, Bruno; Glosten, Larry; Spatt, Chester S - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We survey the literature analysing the price formation and trading process, and the consequences of market organization for price discovery and welfare. We develop a united perspective on theoretical, empirical and experimental approaches. We discuss the evidence on transaction costs and the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005788974

Price Discrimination in Markets for Experts' Services

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

This Paper studies the consequences of price discrimination in a market for experts’ services. In the case of experts …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504480

On Doctors, Mechanics and Computer Specialists. Or Where are the Problems with Credence Goods?

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

that the equilibrium behaviour of experts and consumers in credence goods markets sensitively depends on the details of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791194

Experts vs Discounters: Competition and Market Unravelling When Consumers Do Not Know What they Need

Dulleck, Uwe; Kerschbamer, Rudolf - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper studies price competition between experts and discounters in a market for credence goods. While experts can … giving any advice. The unobservability of diagnosis effort induces experts to use their tariffs as signaling devices. This … makes them vulnerable to competition by discounters. We explore the conditions under which experts survive competition by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792449

Moral Hazard and Non-Exclusive Contracts

Bisin, Alberto; Guaitoli, Danilo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998

This paper studies equilibria for economies characterized by moral hazard (hidden action), in which the set of contracts marketed in equilibrium is determined by the interaction of financial intermediaries. The crucial aspect of the environment that we study is that intermediaries are restricted...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497778

Cutting out the Middleman: Crowdinvesting, Efficiency, and Inequality

Grüner, Hans Peter; Siemroth, Christoph - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We show that direct investments by consumers without the use of financial intermediaries can efficiently allocate financial capital to firms seeking funding for production of a novel consumption good. In our setting, consumers are also investors, and their privately known consumption preferences...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011201361

Stock Market Quality in the Prescence of a Traded Option

de Jong, Cyriel; Koedijk, Kees; Schnitzlein, Charles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We use a controlled economic experiment to examine the implications of asymmetric information for informational linkages between a stock market and a traded call option on that stock. The setting is based on the Kyle model and Back (1993). We find that an insider trades aggressively in both the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789115

Was Prometheus Unbound by Chance? Risk, Diversification and Growth

Acemoglu, Daron; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

This paper offers a theory of development which links the degree of market incompleteness to capital accumulation and growth. At early stages of development, the presence of indivisible projects limits the degree of risk-spreading (diversification) that the economy can achieve. The desire to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124312

Agency Costs in the Process of Development

Acemoglu, Daron; Zilibotti, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1996

We analyse an economy where production is subject to moral hazard. The degree of the incentive (agency) costs introduced by the presence of moral hazard naturally depends on the information structure in the economy; it is cheaper to induce correct incentives in a society which possesses better...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136536

Adverse Selection, Credit, and Efficiency: the Case of the Missing Market

Martin, Alberto - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze a standard environment of adverse selection in credit markets. In our environment, entrepreneurs who are privately informed about the quality of their projects need to borrow in order to invest. Conventional wisdom says that, in this class of economies, the competitive equilibrium is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008854521