We investigate if the proxy voting process transmits valuable information from shareholders to management. A simple strategic voting model is developed and tested in a large sample of management proposals. The evidence suggests that voting is strategic in the sense that shareholders take into...

Debt with many creditors is analysed in a continuous-time pricing model of the levered firm. We specifically allow for debtor opportunism vis-à-vis a non-coordinated group of creditors, in form of repeated strategic renegotiation offers and default threats. We show that the creditors' initial...

This paper offers an explanation of rationally incomplete contracts, where incompleteness refers to unforeseen contingencies. Agents enter a two-sided moral hazard relationship, in which a commitment to discard parts of the joint resources may be ex-ante efficient. This happens through costly...

Joint ventures, a particularly popular form of corporate cooperation, exhibit ownership patterns that are concentrated at 50-50 or ‘50 plus one share’ equity allocations for a wide variety of parent firms. In this Paper, we argue that private control benefits create a discontinuity in...

This Paper considers the financing of a research project under uncertainty about the time of completion and the probability of eventual success. The uncertainty about future success diminishes gradually with the arrival of additional funding. The entrepreneur controls the funds and can divert...

We consider the provision of venture capital in a dynamic agency model. The value of the venture project is initially uncertain and more information arrives by developing the project. The allocation of funds and the learning process are subject to moral hazard. The optimal contract is a...