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Serial CEO Incentives and the Structure of Managerial Contracts
Giannetti, Mariassunta - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007
This paper analyzes the optimal contracting consequences of a recent phenomenon in the managerial labour market, CEO job hopping. I show that if the managerial labour market is thin and firm growth opportunities are weak, the optimal contract rewards the CEO for past performance through a bonus....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504521
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Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260
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Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem
Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003
instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270
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A General Test of Gaming
Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
An important lesson from the incentive literature is that explicit incentives may elicit dysfunctional and unintended responses, also known as gaming responses. The existence of these responses, however, is difficult to demonstrate in practice because this behaviour is typically hidden from the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114434
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Performance Incentives with Award Constraints
Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001
This Paper studies the provision of incentives in a large US training organization, which is divided into about 50 independent pools of training agencies. The number and the size of the agencies within each pool vary greatly. Each pool distributes performance incentive awards to the training...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661877
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An Empirical Investigation of Gaming Responses to Explicit Performance Incentives
Courty, Pascal; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper studies a particular kind of gaming response to explicit incentives in a large government organization. The gaming responses we consider occur when agents strategically report their performance outcomes to maximize their awards. An important contribution of this work is to examine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662347
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Curbing Cream-Skimming: Evidence on Enrolment Incentives
Courty, Pascal; Kim, Do Han; Marschke, Gerald - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
Using data from a large, U.S. federal job training program, we investigate whether enrolment incentives that exogenously vary the ‘shadow prices’ for serving different demographic subgroups of clients influence case workers’ intake decisions. We show that case workers enroll more clients...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666832
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Active Agents, Passive Principals: Does High-Powered CEO Compensation Really Improve Incentives
Dow, James; Raposo, Clara - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
In this Paper we use agency theory to study the active role of the CEO in the formulation of corporate strategy. We allow the agent (CEO) to play a role in defining the parameters of the agency problem, in an incomplete contracting model in which the agent can be rewarded based only on financial...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504388
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Managerial Incentives and Stock Price Manipulation
Peng, Lin; Röell, Ailsa A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
This paper presents a rational expectations model of optimal executive compensation in a setting where managers are in … a position to manipulate short-term stock prices, and managers' propensity to manipulate is uncertain. Stock …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005014567
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Managerial Incentives and Collusive Behaviour
Spagnolo, Giancarlo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004
managers have a preference for smooth time-paths of profits – as revealed by the empirical literature on ‘income smoothing … termination threats make collusion supportable at any discount factor, independent of contracts’ duration. When managers have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667065