This paper reports results from an experiment studying how fines, leniency programs and reward schemes for whistleblowers affect cartel formation and prices. Antitrust without leniency reduces cartel formation, but increases cartel prices: subjects use costly fines as (altruistic) punishments....

We review current methods for calculating fines against cartels in the US and EU, and simulate their deterrence effects under different assumptions on the legal and economic environment. It is likely that European fines have not had significant deterrence effects before leniency programs were...

This paper presents results from a laboratory experiment on the channels through which different law enforcement strategies deter cartel formation. With leniency policies offering immunity to the first reporting party a high fine is the main determinant of deterrence, having a strong effect even...

This model describes the working of hub-and-spoke collusion that has been discussed recently by competition policy authorities. We develop a model of tacit collusion between a manufacturer and two retailers, competing a la Rotemberg and Saloner (1986). The best collusive equilibrium between...

We study cartel contracts using data on 18 contract clauses of 109 legal Finnish manufacturing cartels. One third of the clauses relate to raising profits; the others deal with instability through incentive compatibility, cartel organization, or external threats. Cartels use three main...

The optimal competition policy when licensing is an alternative to a merger, which has the intention of transferring a superior technology, and is derived in a differentiated goods duopoly, as in the cases of Cournot and Bertrand competition. We show that whenever both royalties and fixed fees...

When is the modeller introducing more error when analysing a Cournot market with private cost information - when ignoring market power or when ignoring the impact of incomplete information? Is the welfare loss at the market outcome driven by private information or by market power? The answer,...

A number of European countries, among which the UK and Spain, have opened up their Directory Enquiry Services (DQs) market to competition. In Spain, both local and foreign firms challenged the incumbent as of April 2003. The latter abused its dominant position by providing an inferior quality...

This Paper starts from a recent case studying how merger analysis in Europe may potentially be improved through simulation analysis. Starting from the product and geographic market definition in the Merger Decision, we formulate and estimate an oligopoly model with differentiated products. The...

The inefficiency of Soviet-type economies results from their monopolized production structure, which makes soft budget constraints almost inevitable, as enterprises have bargaining power and must face expropriative tax rates for macroeconomic stability. Systemic reform aims to improve...