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Looking Beyond the Incumbent: The Effects of Exposing Corruption on Electoral Outcomes

Chong, Alberto; De La O, Ana; Karlan, Dean S.; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

Does information about rampant political corruption increase electoral participation and the support for challenger … parties? Democratic theory assumes that offering more information to voters will enhance electoral accountability. However, if … increased support for challengers and higher political participation. We provide experimental evidence that information about …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084114

Centralization and Accountability: Theory and Evidence from the Clean Air Act

Boffa, Federico; Piolatto, Amedeo; Ponzetto, Giacomo AM - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2013

informed voters. In equilibrium, voter information increases government accountability but displays decreasing returns …. Therefore, political centralization reduces aggregate rent extraction when voter information varies across regions. It increases …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011084457

Political Institutions, Environmental Policy and Growth

Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2004

We analyse the impact of micro-founded political institutions on environmental policy and economic growth. We model an overlapping-generations economy, where individuals differ in preferences over the environment (as well as in age). Labour taxation and capital taxation is used to finance a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791516

Clientelism and Aid

Casamatta, Georges; Vellutini, Charles - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

Using a model of probabilistic voting, we analyse the impact of aid on the political equilibrium in the recipient country or region. We consider two kinds of politicians: the benevolent one is interested in promoting social welfare whereas the other one is clientelistic, his only goal being to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124076

Secondary Issues and Party Politics: An Application to Environmental Policy

Anesi, Vincent; De Donder, Philippe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

The paper develops a political economy model to assess the interplay between political party formation and an environmental policy dimension viewed as secondary to the redistributive dimension. We define being a secondary issue in terms of the intensity of preferences over this issue rather than...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498009

Redistributive Politics with Distortionary Taxation

Crutzen, Benoît SY; Sahuguet, Nicolas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

We extend the discussion of redistributive politics across electoral systems to allow for taxation to be distortionary. We allow politicians to choose any tax rate between zero and unity and then redistribute the money collected. We build on the model put forward by Myerson (1993) and Lizzeri...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504298

Optimal top marginal tax rates under income splitting for couples

Bach, Stefan; Corneo, Giacomo; Steiner, Viktor - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

This paper analytically derives optimal top marginal tax rates when couples are taxed according to income splitting between spouses, consumption is taxed, and the skill distribution is unbounded. Optimal top marginal income tax rates are then quantified for Germany. Estimation results based on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009148880

On Income Inequality and Green Preferences

Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We derive conditions of individual preferences and technology that give rise to a negative correlation between income inequality and environmental protection. We present a class of models (which captures a static model as well as an overlapping-generations model) in which individuals differ in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662063

Inequality, Environmental Protection and Growth

Marsiliani, Laura; Renström, Thomas I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

We analyse how, in representative democracies, income distribution influences the stringency of environmental policy and economic growth. Individuals (who differ in abilities) live for two periods, working when young and owning capital when old. Externalities are caused by a polluting factor....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791379

Individual Preferences for Political Redistribution

Corneo, Giacomo; Grüner, Hans Peter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

What drives people's support of governmental reduction of income inequality? We employ data from a large international survey in order to evaluate the explanatory power of three competing forces, referred to as the ‘homo oeconomicus effect’, the ‘public values effect’, and the ‘social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005791645

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