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Almazan, Andres; Suarez, Javier - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2000

This paper explores how motivating an incumbent CEO to make investments that improve the effectiveness of the firm organization under his management interacts with the replacement policy of the board of directors. We characterize the optimal compensation package (including severance pay) under...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123708

Social Networks in the Boardroom

Kramarz, Francis; Thesmar, David - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

This paper provides empirical evidence consistent with the facts that (1) social networks may strongly affect board composition and (2) social networks may be detrimental to corporate governance. Our empirical investigation relies on a unique dataset on executives and outside directors of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124038

Shareholder Protection, Stock Market Development and Politics

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2005

This paper presents a political economy model where there is mutual feedback between investor protection and stock market development. Better investor protection induces companies to issue more equity and thereby leads to a broader stock market. In turn, equity issuance expands the shareholder...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005789093

The Structure of Corporate ownership in Privatized Utilities

Trillas, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

concentration. When political objectives are added to the analysis, it is shown that lobbying with managers induces levels of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123598

The Political Economy of Finance

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

The regulations that shape the design and the operations of corporations, credit and securities markets differ vastly from country to country. In addition, similar regulations are often unequally enforced in different countries. Economists still have an imperfect understanding of why these...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124338

The Political Economy of Corporate Governance

Pagano, Marco; Volpin, Paolo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2001

The Paper analyses the political decision that determines the degree of investor protection. We show that entrepreneurs and workers can strike a political agreement by which low investor protection is exchanged for high employment protection. This ‘corporatist’ agreement is feasible if the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666907

The Political Economy of Bank and Equity Dominance

Perotti, Enrico C; von Thadden, Ernst-Ludwig - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

Legislation affects corporate governance and the return to human and financial capital. We allow the preference of a political majority to determine both the governance structure and the extent of labour rents. In a society where median voters have relatively more at stake in the form of human...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667054

Firms' Decisions on Where to Incorporate

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Cohen, Alma - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

This Paper empirically investigates the decisions of US publicly traded firms on where to incorporate. We study the features of states that make them attractive to incorporating firms and the characteristics of firms that determine whether they incorporate in or out of their state of location....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123946

Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse; Walker, David I - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005114260

Executive Compensation as an Agency Problem

Bebchuk, Lucian Arye; Fried, Jesse - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2003

instrument for addressing the agency problem between managers and shareholders but also as part of the agency problem itself … managers. As a result, managers wield substantial influence over their own pay arrangements, and they have an interest in … reducing the saliency of the amount of their pay and the extent to which that pay is de-coupled from managers’ performance. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662270

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