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Kaniel, Ron; Kondor, Péter - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We analyze the effects of the observed increased share of delegated capital for trading strategies and equilibrium prices by introducing delegation into a standard Lucas exchange economy. In equilibrium, some investors trade on their own account, but others decide to delegate trading to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009322979

Agency Costs, Firm Behaviour and the Nature of Competition

Aghion, Philippe; Dewatripont, Mathias; Rey, Patrick - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

This paper develops an agency model in which firms can influence their own incentives to provide a non …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005067540

Bankers and bank investors: Reconsidering the economies of scale in banking

Anderson, Ronald W.; Jõeveer, Karin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study economies of scale in banking by viewing banks as combinations of financial and human capital that create rents which accrue to investors and bankers. Applying this approach to annual data of US bank holding companies since 1990, we find much stronger evidence of economies of scale in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083300

Agency, Firm Growth and Managerial Turnover

Anderson, Ronald W.; Bustamante, Maria Cecilia; … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2012

We study managerial incentive provision under moral hazard in a firm subject to stochastic growth opportunities. In our model, managers are dismissed after poor performance, but also when an alternative manager is more capable of growing the firm. The optimal contract may involve managerial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083381

Delegation and Dynamic Incentives

Shin, Dongsoo; Strausz, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

Using an agency model, we show how delegation, by generating additional private information, improves dynamic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083436

The Dynamics of Investment, Payout and Debt

Lambrecht, Bart; Myers, Stewart C - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We present a dynamic agency model of investment, borrowing and payout decisions by a mature corporation operating in …. Managers do not rebalance capital structure, so shocks to debt levels persist. Managers implement precautionary savings by … agency models and from dynamic models based on financing frictions. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083994

The Geography of Development: Evaluating Migration Restrictions and Coastal Flooding

Desmet, Klaus; Nagy, David Krisztián; Rossi-Hansberg, … - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015

We study the relationship between geography and growth. To do so, we first develop a dynamic spatial growth theory with realistic geography. We characterize the model and its balanced growth path and propose a methodology to analyze equilibria with different levels of migration frictions. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011252617

Race v. Suffrage: The Determinants of Development in Mississippi

Bertocchi, Graziella; Dimico, Arcangelo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

1950s. Finally, we turn to the determinants of a broad array of development indicators for the year 1960 and for the 1960 …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009321839

The Evolution of the Racial Gap in Education and the Legacy of Slavery

Bertocchi, Graziella; Dimico, Arcangelo - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

We study the evolution of racial educational inequality across US states from 1940 to 2000. We show that throughout this period, despite evidence of convergence, the racial gap in attainment between blacks and whites has been persistently determined by the initial gap. We obtain these results...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009399722

Inequality, Development, and the Stability of Democracy -Lipset and Three Critical Junctures in German History

Jung, Florian; Sunde, Uwe - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2011

distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The results imply that for any level of development … resources for which democracy is infeasible in equilibrium irrespective of the level of development. The model also delivers …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493564

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