Showing 1 - 10 of 438
This paper studies the endogenous emergence of political regimes in societies in which productive resources are distributed unequally and institutions do not ensure political commitments. The results imply that for any level of development there exists a distribution of resources such that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009493564
We report on an on-going project, which asks a number of questions relevant to the study of state capacity. What are the main economic and political determinants of the state’s capacity to raise revenue and support private markets? How do risks of violent conflict affect the incentives to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005036244
We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213305
We study the dynamic support for fiscal decentralization in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. We show that corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time. However, centralization makes more difficult for citizens to detect corrupt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468714
This Paper studies the relationship between political wealth redistribution and the allocation of firm-ownership when production requires an unobservable input. The economy's wealth distribution affects the equilibrium interest rate and the allocation of entrepreneurial rents because wealth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123568
How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absence of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to be well-informed himself, and to gather information he may use either a secret service or the media. The danger of using a secret...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123655
The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most dictators throughout history. Better informed viziers are also better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the dictator. To avoid this, dictators – especially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123685
This Paper uses a large new panel data set to examine the relationship between elections and fiscal policy. We find clear evidence of political business cycles in macroeconomic policy: spending increases before elections while revenues fall, leading to a larger deficit in election years. We also...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005124073
We initiate examination of the political boundaries of the firm by exploring the phenomenon of ‘businessman candidates’: business owners and managers who bypass conventional means of political influence to run for public office themselves. We argue that in-house production of political...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136612
Although the theoretical literature often uses lobbying and corruption synonymously, the empirical literature associates lobbying with the preferred mean for exerting influence in developed countries and corruption with the preferred one in developing countries. This paper challenges these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005136644