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Democratization or Repression?
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
Regimes controlled by a rich elite often collapse and make way for democracy amidst widespread social unrest. Such … therefore be forced to choose between repression and the most generous concession, a transition to full democracy. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005666486
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A Theory of Political Transitions
Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999
unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more … redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy … more costly for the elite, highly unequal societies are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005661707
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So Closed: Political Selection in Proportional Systems
Galasso, Vincenzo; Nannicini, Tommaso - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2015
We analyze political selection in a closed list proportional system where parties have strong gate-keeping power, which they use as an instrument to pursue votes. Parties face a trade-off between selecting loyal candidates or experts, who are highly valued by the voters and thus increase the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011213305
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Social Mobility and the Demand for Redistribution: the POUM Hypothesis
Bénabou, Roland; Ok, Efe A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1998
Even relatively poor people oppose high rates of redistribution because of the anticipation that they, or their children, may move up the income ladder. This ‘Prospect of Upward Mobility’ (POUM) hypothesis is commonly advanced to explain why democracies do not engage in large-scale...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662178
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Ideology
Bénabou, Roland - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008
I develop a model of ideologies as collectively sustained (yet individually rational) distortions in beliefs concerning the proper scope of governments versus markets. In processing and interpreting signals of the efficacy of public and market provision of education, health insurance, pensions,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005662410
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Financial liberalization and democracy: The role of reform reversals
Campos, Nauro F; Coricelli, Fabrizio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2009
partial or captured democracy. We provide as well econometric support showing that even when de facto is modelled as a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004964420
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Lobbying, Corruption and Political Influence
Campos, Nauro F; Giovannoni, Francesco - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
Conventional wisdom suggests that lobbying is the preferred mean for exerting political influence in rich countries and corruption the preferred one in poor countries. Analyses of their joint effects are understandably rare. This paper provides a theoretical framework that focus on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005792187
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Fiscal Centralization and the Political Process
Albornoz-Crespo, Facundo; Cabrales, Antonio - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2010
We study the dynamic support for fiscal decentralization in a political agency model from the perspective of a region. We show that corruption opportunities are lower under centralization at each period of time. However, centralization makes more difficult for citizens to detect corrupt...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008468714
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Capital Redistribution and the Market Allocation of Firm-Ownership
Grüner, Hans Peter; Schils, Ruediger - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002
This Paper studies the relationship between political wealth redistribution and the allocation of firm-ownership when production requires an unobservable input. The economy's wealth distribution affects the equilibrium interest rate and the allocation of entrepreneurial rents because wealth...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123568
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Media Freedom, Bureaucratic Incentives and the Resource Curse
Egorov, Georgy; Guriev, Sergei; Sonin, Konstantin - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006
How can a non-democratic ruler provide proper incentives for state bureaucracy? In the absence of competitive elections and separation of powers, the ruler has to be well-informed himself, and to gather information he may use either a secret service or the media. The danger of using a secret...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005123655