Similar Search Results

Insurance and Information: Firms as a Commitment Device

Bovenberg, A Lans; Teulings, Coen N - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

explicit contracts to crowd out implicit insurance provided by the firm, even though the latter yields higher welfare. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005667043

Unemployment Insurance Design: Inducing Moving and Retraining

Hassler, John; Mora, Rodríguez; Vicente, José - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

those may be unobservable ex-ante. The problem of characterizing constrained optimal unemployment insurance in this case has … been neglected in previous literature. We construct a model of optimal unemployment insurance where multiple incentive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504238

Risk Taking and Optimal Contracts for Money Managers

Palomino, Frédéric; Prat, Andrea - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1999

Recent empirical work suggests a strong connection between the incentives money managers are offered and their risk-taking behavior. We develop a general model of delegated portfolio management, with the feature that the agent can control the riskiness of the portfolio. This represents a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504241

The Labour Market and Corporate Structure

Acemoglu, Daron; Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 1997

This paper analyses the impact of labour demand and labour market regulations on the corporate structure of fims. It finds that higher wages are associated with lower monitoring, irrespective of whether these high wages are caused by labour market regulations, unions or higher labour demand....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504251

A Dynamic Analysis of the Demand for Health Insurance and Health Care

Bolhaar, Jonneke; Lindeboom, Maarten; van der Klaauw, Bas - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2008

insurance. For this we specify and estimate dynamic models for health insurance decisions and health care utilization. Estimates …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504294

Risk-bearing and Entrepreneurship

Newman, Andrew - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

In the 'Knightian' theory of entrepreneurship, entrepreneurs provide insurance to workers by paying fixed wages and … bear all the risk of production. This paper endogenizes entrepreneurial risk by allowing for optimal insurance contracts as … well as the occupational self-selection. Moral hazard prevents full insurance; increases in an agent’s wealth then entail …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504306

Relating Output and Volatility in a Model of International Risk-Sharing with Limited Commitment

Reichlin, Pietro - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2006

I study the constrained efficient allocations of a simple model of risk sharing and capital flows across countries assuming that each country cannot commit to fully repay its contract obligations. In the model, the degree of risk sharing and the amount of investment are interdependent. It is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005504378

Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment

Karlan, Dean S.; Zinman, Jonathan - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2007

Information asymmetries are important in theory but difficult to identify in practice. We estimate the presence and importance of adverse selection and moral hazard in a consumer credit market using a new field experiment methodology. We randomized 58,000 direct mail offers issued by a major...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005497798

Moral Hazard and Capital Structure Dynamics

Dewatripont, Mathias; Legros, Patrick; Matthews, Steven A - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2002

We base a contracting theory for a start-up firm on an agency model with observable but nonverifiable effort, and renegotiable contracts. Two essential restrictions on simple contracts are imposed: the entrepreneur must be given limited liability, and the investor's earnings must not decrease in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005498043

The Ratchet Effect Re-examined: A Learning Perspective

Bhaskar, Venkataraman - C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers - 2014

We study dynamic moral hazard where principal and agent are symmetrically uncertain about job difficulty. Since effort is unobserved, shirking leads the principal to believe that the job is hard, increasing the agent's continuation value. So deterring shirking requires steeper incentives, which...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011083528