We use the German Job Vacancy Survey to investigate whether firms are able to attract more suitable applicants by offering bargain wages rather than posting fixed wages. Contrary to the theoretical predictions provided by the literature, we find that the offer to bargain over pay decreases the...

Models of random search, directed search, or stock-ow matching differ substantially in the way they assume that job seekers and firms behave during the recruitment process. In this paper we identify new patterns about the recruitment behaviour of firms using the entropy balancing technique and...

We use the German Job Vacancy Survey to investigate whether firms are able to attract more suitable applicants by offering bargain wages rather than posting fixed wages. Contrary to the theoretical predictions provided by the literature, we find that the offer to bargain over pay decreases the...

Models of random search, directed search, or stock-ow matching differ substantially in the way they assume that job seekers and firms behave during the recruitment process. In this paper we identify new patterns about the recruitment behaviour of firms using the entropy balancing technique and...

Models of random search, directed search, or stock-ow matching differ substantially in the way they assume that job seekers and firms behave during the recruitment process. In this paper we identify new patterns about the recruitment behaviour of firms using the entropy balancing technique and...

This paper brings together the modern literatures on monopsony power and labor unions by empirically examining the effects of unionization on the dynamics of worker earnings across differently concentrated markets. Exploiting tax reforms to union due deductions as exogenous shocks to...

This paper brings together the modern research on employer power and employee power by empirically examining the effects of unionization on worker earnings, employment, and inequality across differently concentrated markets. Exploiting national tax reforms to union membership dues as exogenous...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise if workers do not know where other workers apply to (this affects network creation) and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider (this affects network clearing). We show that those frictions and the...

When workers send applications to vacancies they create a network. Frictions arise because workers typically do not know where other workers apply to and firms do not know which candidates other firms consider. The first coordination friction affects network formation, while the second...