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Strategic leaks in first-price auctions and tacit collusion : the case of spying and counter-spying
Fan, Cuihong; Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012507333
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Collusion in beauty contests
Wambach, Achim - 2002
During the recent sales of UMTS licenses in Europe some countries used auctions while others resorted to so … argument why beauty contests or negotiations might be dominated by auctions, which is closely linked to the multi …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409963
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Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion : The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231973
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Strategic Leaks in First-Price Auctions and Tacit Collusion: The Case of Spying and Counter-Spying
Fan, Cuihong; Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2021
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012582084
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Core-stable rings in auctions with independent private values
Biran, Omer; Forges, Françoise - 2010
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273875
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Auctions and corruption
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2000
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This delegation invites corruption. In this paper we … bidding, and how it altogether changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we characterize incentive schemes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011397659
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Collusive Bidding: Lessons from the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2000
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) spectrum auctions use a simultaneous ascending auction design. Bidders bid … mitigate collusive bidding in the spectrum auctions, and then apply these ideas to the design of daily electricity auctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988751
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Collusive Bidding in the FCC Spectrum Auctions
Cramton, Peter; Schwartz, Jesse - University of Maryland, Department of Economics - Peter … - 2002
This paper describes the signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. The FCC's simultaneous ascending … auctions allowed bidders to bid on numerous communication licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004988795
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Policy innovations, political preferences, and cartel prosecutions
Ghosal, Vivek; Sokol, D. Daniel - 2015
, collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346282
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Fighting collusion by permitting price discrimination
Helfrich, Magdalena; Herweg, Fabian - 2016
We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …' discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011434582