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Based on the "acquiring-a-company" game of Samuelson and Bazerman (1985), we theoretically and experimentally analyze the acquisition of a firm. Thereby we compare cases of symmetrically and asymmetrically informed buyers and sellers. This setting allows us to predict and test the effects of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010253149
We enrich the choice task of responders in ultimatum games by allowing them to independently decide whether to collect what is offered to them and whether to destroy what the proposer demanded. Such a multidimensional response format intends to cast further light on the motives guiding responder...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010395127
equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944228
available pie. The experiments control for intentionality of exclusion and veto power of the third party. We do not find … evidence for indirect reciprocity of the remaining responder after the exclusion of the other. Similarly, not excluding the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009374355
cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives - namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring - in … a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and … reciprocity. In contrast, anchoring plays only a marginal role. Compared to what previously found in linear voluntary contribution …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009313091
We experimentally manipulate the efficiency of trust and reciprocity in a modified Investment Game. The aim of our … manipulation is to test whether reciprocity is mainly affected by payoff consequences of trust or by intentions underlying it. We … efficiency of trust as well as by efficiency of reciprocity. However, trustors do not fully exploit the high efficiency gains …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009567106
In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for efficiency than for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003952438
Experimental studies of the WTP-WTA gap avoid social trading by implementing an incentive compatible mechanism for each individual trader. We compare a traditional random price mechanism and a novel elicitation mechanism preserving social trading, without sacrificing mutual incentive...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252391
In generosity games, one agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the "pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiency or equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008758824
Two pairs of two participants each interact repeatedly in two structurally independent but informationally linked Prisonerś Dilemma games. Neither pair receives feedback about past choices by their own partner but is fully informed about the choices by the other pair. Considering this as a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010252395