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Interactions between players with private information and opposed interests are often prone to bad advice and inefficient outcomes, e.g. markets for financial or health care services. In a deception game we investigate experimentally which factors could improve advice quality. Besides advisor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011881706
Motivated agents are characterized by increasing their effort if their work generates not only a monetary return for them but also a benefit for a mission they support. While their motivation may stem from working for their preferred (i.e., the `right') mission, it may also be the principal's...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011401176
This paper studies how pay transparency affects organizations that reward employees based on their efforts (i.e., using “subjective performance evaluation”). First, we show that transparency triggers social comparisons that require the organization to pay its employees an “envy premium”....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250033
equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944228
discrimination enhances efficiency as it facilitates coordination among agents. The only evidence for reciprocity is that subjects … ; experimental study ; envy ; reciprocity ; pay secrecy …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003924261
We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013217557
Sanctions are widely used to promote compliance in principal-agent-relationships. While there is ample evidence confirming the predicted positive incentive effect of sanctions, it has also been shown that imposing sanctions may in fact reduce compliance by crowding-out intrinsic motivation. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944178
Advantageous (or propitious) selection occurs when an increase in the premium of an insurance contract induces high-cost agents to quit, thereby reducing the average cost among remaining buyers. Hemenway (1990) and many subsequent contributions motivate its advent by differences in risk-aversion...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014083046
than agents who have ex-ante higher ability when the principals are able to make them feeling indebted. -- reciprocity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009621822
We study interfirm price competition in the presence of horizontal and vertical intrafirm conflicts in each firm. Intrafirm conflicts are captured by a principal-agent framework with firms employing more than one agent and implementing a tournament incentive scheme. The principals offer premium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009310130