Similar Search Results

Do reciprocators exploit or resist moral wiggle room? : an experimental analysis

Matthey, Astrid; Regner, Tobias - 2015

experiment, a trust game variant, we study whether moral wiggle room also prevails, when reciprocity is a potential motivation … reciprocity. Among our subjects, 40% of the reciprocators exploited moral wiggle room. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011446176

Co-employment of permanently and temporarily employed agents

Güth, Werner; Kocher, Martin; Angelova, Vera - 2010

equal treatment of agents. Discrimination is, thus, a consequence of reciprocity. Agents that are discriminated against …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944228

Unravelling conditional cooperation : reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring in public goods provision

Cappelletti, Dominique; Güth, Werner; Ploner, Matteo - 2011

cooperation. We try to assess the relative importance of three motives - namely reciprocity, inequity aversion, and anchoring - in … a non-linear voluntary contribution experiment. We find that, for those conditionally cooperating, both reciprocity and … reciprocity. In contrast, anchoring plays only a marginal role. Compared to what previously found in linear voluntary contribution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009313091

Equity versus efficiency? : Evidence from three-person generosity experiments

Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred; … - 2010

In two-person generosity games the proposer's agreement payoff is exogenously given whereas that of the responder is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the pie size. Earlier results for two-person generosity games show that participants seem to care more for efficiency than for...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003952438

Unraveling fairness in simple games? : the role of empathy and theory of mind

Artinger, Florian; Exadaktylos, Filippos; Koppel, Hannes; … - 2010

Economists have been theorizing that other-regarding preferences influence decision making. Yet, what are the corresponding psychological mechanisms that inform these preferences in laboratory games? Empathy and Theory of Mind (ToM) are dispositions considered to be essential in social...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003980496

Does entitlement crowd out efficiency or equality seeking? : selling the roles in generosity game experiments

Bäker, Agnes; Güth, Werner; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, … - 2010

In generosity games, one agreement payoff is exogenously given, whereas the other is endogenously determined by the proposer's choice of the "pie" size. This has been shown to induce pie choices which are either efficiency or equality seeking. In our experiment, before playing the generosity...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008758824

Beyond procedural equity and reciprocity

Chlaß, Nadine; Güth, Werner; Miettinen, Topi - 2009

Most research in economics models agents somehow motivated by outcomes. Here, we model agents motivated by procedures instead, where procedures are defined independently of an outcome. To that end, we design procedures which yield the same expected outcomes or carry the same information on...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003887119

Win shift lose stay : an experimental test of non-compete clauses

Bünstorf, Guido; Engel, Christoph; Fischer, Sven; … - 2013

We experimentally test the effect of enforceable non-compete clauses on working efforts. The employee can invest into the probability of making a profitable innovation. After a successful innovation (Win) the employee may want to leave the firm (Shift) whereas after an innovation failure (Lose)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010189318

Is fairness blind? : The effect of framing on preferences for effort-sharing rules

Carlsson, Frederik; Kataria, Mitesh; Lampi, Elina; … - 2010

By using a choice experiment, this paper focuses on citizens' preferences for effort-sharing rules of how carbon abatement should be shared among countries. We find that Swedes do not rank the rule favoring their own country highest. Instead, they prefer the rule where all countries are allowed...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003952444

Lying, spying, sabotaging : procedures and consequences

Chlaß, Nadine; Riener, Gerhard - 2015

We study individuals who can choose how to compete with an opponent for one nonzero payoff. They can either nudge themselves into a fair set of rules where they have the same information and actions as their opponent, or into unfair rules where they spy, sabotage or fabricate their opponent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342449