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We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231973
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012582084
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273875
largest rms bidding in provincial road paving procurement auctions in Quebec between 2007 and 2015. I use the police … investigation into collusion and corruption in the Quebec construction industry launched in October 2009 to capture the end of this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012129347
A number of recent papers have proposed that a pattern of isolated winning bids may be associated with collusion. In … contrast, others have suggested that bid clustering, especially of the two lowest bids, is indicative of collusion. In this …, whose asphalt industry has not been the subject of collusion allegations. Our findings provide causal evidence that the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012299673
We show that it is beneficial for a buyer to conduct a multi-stage mechanism if bidders are loss averse. In a first step, we derive a revenue equivalence principle. Fixing the multi-stage structure, the revenue is independent of the chosen payment rule. Secondly, we introduce a simple two-stage...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012146346
We study the role of commitment in a first-price auction environment. We devise a simple two-stage model in which bidders first submit an initial offer that the auctioneer can observe and then make a counteroffer. There is no commitment on the auctioneer's side to accept an offer as is or even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012150752
Winners in online auctions frequently fail to complete purchases. Major auction platforms therefore allow "second …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012237211
In auctions bidders are usually assumed to have rational expectations with regards to their winning probability … auctions, I show that by decreasing the time between bids and revelation of results, the auctioneer can induce bidders to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013463574
underperforms in terms of efficiency relative to the winner-pay auctions. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012500904