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Security Bid Auctions for Agency Contracts
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2013
A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328749
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Auctions with Imperfect Commitment when the Reserve May Serve as a Signal
Jun, Byoung Heon; Wolfstetter, Elmar G. - 2014
If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by strategic non-participation, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010333455
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Flow Trading
Budish, Eric B.; Cramton, Peter C.; Kyle, Albert S.; … - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023
-linear demand curves with quantities as flows (shares/second). Batch auctions clear all asset markets jointly in discrete time …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014250116
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Procurement with unforeseen contingencies
Herweg, Fabian; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011770710
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Immediate demand reduction in simultaneous ascending bid auctions
Riedel, Frank; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2004
The present note analyzes the Simultaneous Ascending Bid Auction with arbitrarily many bidders with decreasing marginal valuations under complete information. We show that the game is solvable by iterated elimination of weakly dominated strategies if the efficient allocation assigns at least one...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261069
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Bid rigging : an analysis of corruption in auctions
Lengwiler, Yvan; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2005
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption … profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in first- and second-price auctions, show how corruption distorts the allocation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261291
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The Quantitative View of Myerson Regularity
Schweizer, Nikolaus; Szech, Nora - 2016
In mechanism design, Myerson regularity is often too weak for a quantitative analysis of performance. For instance, ratios between revenue and welfare, or sales probabilities may vanish at the boundary of Myerson regularity. This paper therefore explores the quantitative version of Myerson...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431257
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Mechanism Design with Narratives
Lang, Matthias - 2020
Individuals use narratives as rationales or justifications to make their claims more convincing. I provide a general framework for partial verifiability based on narratives. Narratives give many reasons and arguments. The receiver derives the message's meaning by aggregating these reasons; her...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012824823
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Strategic supply function competition with private information
Vives, Xavier - 2009
A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The costs of the sellers have uncertain common and private value components and there is no exogenous noise in the system. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized; the equilibrium is privately...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276986
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An Externality-Robust Auction: Theory and Experimental Evidence
Bartling, Björn; Netzer, Nick - 2014
An auction is externality-robust if unilateral deviations from equilibrium leave the other bidders’ payoffs unaffected. The equilibrium and its outcome will then persist if certain types of externalities arise between bidders. One example are externalities due to spiteful preferences, which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352386