Similar Search Results

Reciprocity and emotions when reciprocators know each other

Reuben, Ernesto; van Winden, Frans - 2006

This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a take authority is matched with two responders. The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the take authority decides how much of the endowment of each responder that is left after the second stage will be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261421

Optimal and Fair Prizing in Sequential Round-Robin Tournaments : Experimental Evidence

Lauber, Arne; March, Christoph; Sahm, Marco - 2022

the prize structure aﬀects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293842

Behavioural Responses to Unfair Institutions : Experimental Evidence on Rule Compliance, Norm Polarisation and Trust

Columbus, Simon; Kasper, Matthias; Feld, Lars P.; … - 2023

This study investigates the effects of unfair enforcement of institutional rules on public good contributions, personal and social norms, and trust. In a preregistered online experiment (n = 1,038), we find that biased institutions reduce rule compliance compared to fair institutions. However,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014345629

Incentive magnitude effects in experimental games : bigger is not necessarily better

Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Loomes, Graham - In: Games 9 (2018) 1/4, pp. 1-10

In experimental games, task-related incentives are payments to experimental subjects that vary according to their strategy choices and the consequent outcomes of the games. Limited evidence exists regarding incentive magnitude effects in experimental games. We examined one-off strategy choices...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011848336

Fairness and reciprocity in the Hawk-Dove game

Neugebauer, Tibor; Poulsen, Anders; Schram, Arthur - 2002

We study fairness and reciprocity in a Hawk-Dove game. This alllows us to testvarious models in one framework. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327528

Fairness and transparency in one-to-many bargaining with complementarity : an experimental study

Mak, Vincent; Zwick, Rami - In: Games 15 (2024) 4, pp. 1-29

complementarity and how it is influenced by fairness concern and information transparency. We base our setup on a structured … value of the deal approximately half-half with the buyer as a normative fairness benchmark. The buyers, on the other hand …, did not have a demand for fairness that was based on a fairness benchmark. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015073214

Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public good experiments

Fischbacher, Urs; Gächter, Simon - 2008

We provide a test of the role of social preferences and beliefs in voluntary cooperation and its decline. We elicit individuals' cooperation preferences in one experiment and use them as well as subjects' elicited beliefs to explain contributions to a public good played repeatedly. We find...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273781

The attack and defense of weakest-link networks

Kovenock, Dan; Roberson, Brian; Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2010

This paper experimentally examines behavior in a two-player game of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets, in which the attacker's objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender's objective is diametrically opposed. We apply two benchmark contest...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274929

The trust game behind the veil of ignorance : a note on gender differences

Výrašteková, Jana; Onderstal, Sander - 2010

We analyze gender differences in the trust game in a behind the veil of ignorance design. This method yields strategies that are consistent with actions observed in the classical trust game experiments. We observe that, on average, men and women do not differ in trust, and that women are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380925

The behavioral impact of emotions in a power to take game : an experimental study

Bosman, Ronald; Winden, Frans A. A. M. van - 1999

The power to take game is a simple two player game where players arerandomly divided into pairs consisting of a take authority and responder.Both players in each pair have earned an own income in an individual realeffort decision-making experiment preceding the take game. The gameconsists of two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011301155

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Next
Last