Market-based instruments are believed to create more efficient incentives for firmsto adopt new technologies than command-and-control policies. We compare the effects of a directtechnology regulation and of an adoption subsidy under asymmetric information about the costsof technological advances...

This paper develops a model with an endogenous number of cities to explore whether local governments establish the optimal city size when key activities in the city are associated with emissions that harm consumers. In contrast to extant research, our model is fully micro-founded with respect to...

This paper studies the impact of national carbon taxes on CO2 emissions. To do so, we run local projections on a cross-country panel dataset, matching measures of emissions of carbon dioxide with information on the introduction of carbon taxes and their implied price. Importantly, we consider...

We study the implications of climate change and the associated mitigation measures for optimal monetary policy in a canonical New Keynesian model with climate externalities. Provided they are set at their socially optimal level, carbon taxes pose no trade-offs for monetary policy: it is both...

This paper analyzes enhanced cooperation agreements in corporate taxation in a three country tax competition model where countries differ in size. We characterize equilibrium tax rates and the optimal tax responses due to the formation of an enhanced cooperation agreement. Conditions for...

We examine an open economy’s strategy to reduce its carbon emissions by replacing its consumption of coal—very carbon intensive—with gas—less so. Unlike the standard theoretical approach to carbon leakage, we show that unilateral CO2 reduction policies generate a higher leakage rate in...

The control of carbon emissions by policymakers poses the corporate challenge of developing an optimal carbon management policy. We provide a unified model that characterizes how firms should optimally manage emissions through production, green investment, and the trading of carbon credits. We...

In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one or both countries are Kantians in Roemer’s sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any given tax rate of the other country, which indicates that...

In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about tax coordination under complete and incomplete...