Using longitudinal data on individuals from the European Community Household Panel (ECHP) for thirteen countries during 1995-2001, I investigate the wage premium for permanent jobs relative to temporary jobs. The countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland,...

We investigate the role of temporary contracts in shaping wage inequality in a dual labour market. Based on Italian individual-level administrative data, our analysis focuses on new hires in temporary and open-ended contracts for the period of 2005-2015. To estimate the presence of differentials...

This study uses panel data for Australia from the HILDA Survey to estimate the wage differential between workers in temporary jobs and workers in permanent jobs. Specifically, unconditional quantile regression methods with fixed effects are used to examine how this gap varies over the entire...

This paper extends the standard work effort model by allowing workers to interact through networks. We investigate experimentally whether peer performances and peer contextual effects influence individual performances. Two types of network are considered. Participants in Recursive networks are...

We investigate whether peer effects at work differ by gender and whether the gender difference in peer effects – if any – depends on work organization, precisely the structure of social networks. We develop a social network model with gender heterogeneity that we test by means of a...

Empirical labor economists have resorted to estimating the responsiveness of workers' wages on firms' ability to pay to assess the extent to which employers share rents with their employees. This paper compares this labor economics approach with two other approaches that rely on standard micro...

Researchers contributing to the empirical rent-sharing literature have typically resorted to estimating the responsiveness of workers' wages on firms' ability to pay in order to assess the extent to which employers share rents with their employees. This paper compares rent-sharing estimates...

We study, theoretically and empirically, the effects of incentives on the self-selection and coordination of motivated agents to produce a social good. Agents join teams where they allocate effort to either generate individual monetary rewards (selfish effort) or contribute to the production of...