Mobility of workers involves flows of labour, human capital and other production factors and thus contributes to a more efficient allocation of resources. Besides these effects on allocative efficiency, migrant flows affect relative wages and also change the international and national...

European Union economies are pressed by (i) a demographic change that induces population ageing and a decline of the workforce, and (ii) a split labour market that is characterized by high levels of unemployment for low -skilled people and a simultaneous shortage of skilled workers. This lack of...

The process of matching between firms and workers is an important mechanism in determining the distribution of wages. In a labor market characterised by large dispersion of workers' productivity and worker-firm complementarity, high quality firms have strong incentives to screen for the quality...

We analyze the welfare effects of trade and migration, focusing on two-sided horizontal heterogeneity among workers and firms. We prove the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium in a two stage game of firm entry (including choice of skill-types) and pricing, involving monopsony power on...

We analyse how institutional and political decisions are intertwined. Citizens who differ in their mobility and ability vote first on labour market integration and afterwards on education policy. The institutional decision on integration influences the succeeding education policy. More...

The paper studies the effect that skilled labour mobility has on efficient education policy. The model is one of two periods in which a representative taxpayer decides on labour, education, and saving. The government can only use linear tax and subsidy instruments. It is shown that the mobility...

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition reduces the distortion from the informational asymmetry...