We We integrate individual power in groups into general equilibrium models. The relationship between group formation, resource allocation, and the power of specific individuals or particular sociological groups is investigated. We introduce, via an illustrative example, three appealing concepts...

This paper presents a generalized moments (GM) approach to estimating an R-th order spatial regressive process in a panel data error component model. We derive moment conditions to estimate the parameters of the higher order spatial regressive process and the optimal weighting matrix required to...

This paper generalizes the approach to estimating a first-order spatial autoregressive model with spatial autoregressive disturbances (SARAR(1,1)) in a cross-section with heteroskedastic innovations by Kelejian and Prucha (2008) to the case of spatial autoregressive models with spatial...

This paper develops an estimator for higher-order spatial autoregressive panel data error component models with spatial autoregressive disturbances, SARAR(R,S). We derive the moment conditions and optimal weighting matrix without distributional assumptions for a generalized moments (GM)...

We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the platform choices of candidates would exist. Our game with financing of political campaigns exhibits two...

In this paper we examine the potential of democratic constitutions for the provision of divisible public goods in a large economy. Our main insights are as follows: When aggregate shocks are absent, the combination of the following rules yields first-best allocations: a supermajority rule, equal...

We explore the design of self-financing tax/subsidy mechanisms to solve hold-up problems in environmental regulation. Under Cournot competition, announcing the subsidy rate seems to be preferable to announcing the tax rate. Moreover, for constant marginal damage the hold-up problem can always be...

Politicians may pander to public opinion and may renounce undertaking beneficial long-term projects. To alleviate this problem, we introduce a triple mechanism involving political information markets, reelection threshold contracts, and democratic elections. An information market is used to...

This paper proposes a model where heterogeneous firms choose whether to undertake R&D or not. Innovative firms are more productive, have larger investment opportunities and lower own funds for necessary tangible continuation investments than non-innovating firms. As a result, they are...

This paper proposes a generalized panel data model with random effects and first-order spatially autocorrelated residuals that encompasses two previously suggested specifications. The first one is described in Anselin's (1988) book and the second one by Kapoor, Kelejian, and Prucha (2007). Our...