Showing 1 - 10 of 53
Overbidding in second-price auctions (SPAs) has been shown to be persistent and associated with cognitive ability. We study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills. Employing an order-balanced design, we use...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693
We report results from the first experimental study of round-robin tournaments. In our experiment, we investigate how the prize structure affects the intensity, fair-ness, and dynamic behavior in sequential round-robin tournaments with three players. We compare tournaments with a second prize...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013293842
information. The absence of the signaling effect seems related to the perception of managers’ intentions, a mitigating but …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014259692
In games with strategic complementarities, public information about the state of the world has a larger impact on … equilibrium actions than private information of the same precision, because the former is more informative about the likely … reasoning. Stated second order beliefs indicate that subjects underestimate the information contained in public signals about …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010266086
the two-player case with complete and incomplete information, and in so doing identify what we call the 'Herodotus Paradox.' …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010272937
We propose a semi-cooperative game theoretic approach to check whether a given coalition is stable in a Bayesian game with independent private values. The ex ante expected utilities of coalitions, at an incentive compatible (noncooperative) coalitional equilibrium, describe a (cooperative)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273875
This paper examines conflicts in which performance is measured by the players' success or failure in multiple component conflicts, commonly termed 'battlefields'. In multi-battlefield conflicts, behavioral linkages across battlefields depend both on the technologies of conflict within each...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274746
I characterize the optimal accuracy level r of an unbiased Tullock contest between two players with heterogeneous prize valuations. The designer maximizes the winning probability of the strong player or the winner’s expected valuation by choosing a contest with an all-pay auction equilibrium...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013298366
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