This paper assesses the relevance of intellectual property rights (IPRs) in the knowledge economy (KE)-finance nexus using the four variables identified under the World Bank's knowledge economy index (KEI) and seven financial intermediary dynamics of depth, efficiency, activity and size. Three...

The paper proposes the measurement of managerial and functional capabilities of the organization, as the dimensions of managerial potential, based on the configurative theory and not on the reductionist one. The components of the managerial potential are fulfilled by the capability of building...

Application software is one of the most important elements of any information system. The most recent trend in the field of the software is, undoubtedly, migration of classic applications from centralized computer architectures to network or distributed architectures. This migration as well as...

This article examines the incentive to merge in a Bertrand competition model with generalized substitutability and price competition. The model suggests that acquisition of firms by their rivals can result in maximal concentration of the industry.

This note shows that when products are complements in the mixed duopoly market, both public and private firms choose excess capacity. This contrasts with substitute case, where public firm strategically chooses under-capacity while private firm keeps holding excess capacity.

In a vertically differentiated oligopoly, firms raise cost-reducing alliances before competing with each other. It is shown that heterogeneity in quality and in cost functions reduces individual incentives to form links. Furthermore, both differentiated Cournot and Bertrand competition...

The aim of this work is to test the Gibrat's Law hypothesis for Brazilian firms. Gibrat''s Law establishes that firm growth is a random walk, it means that the probability of a given proportionale change in size during a specified period is the same for all firms in a given industry. This work...

This note uses a three-stage delegation-licensing-quantity game to study the licensing of a cost-reducing innovation by a patent-holding firm to its competitor. It is shown that licensing is less likely to occur under strategic delegation compared to no delegation.

This paper investigates the bargaining between owners and managers over their managerial delegation contracts, in order to explain the disclosure obligation that is central to many modern corporate governance codes. We consider the managerial incentive contracts based on the profit and sales of...