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Measuring strategic uncertainty in coordination games
Heinemann, Frank; Nagel, Rosemarie; Ockenfels, Peter - 2004
subjective beliefs of players. In a laboratory experiment we measure subjects? certainty equivalents for three coordination games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261109
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Finite-population 'Mass-Action' and evolutionary stability
Bernergard, Axel; Wärneryd, Karl - 2011
Nash proposed an interpretation of mixed strategies as the average pure-strategy play of a population of players randomly matched to play a normal-form game. If populations are finite, some equilibria of the underlying game have no such corresponding 'mass-action' equilibrium. We show that for...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275024
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Contract adjustment under uncertainty
Holden, Helge; Holden, Lars; Holden, Steinar - 2005
Consider a contract over trade in continuous time between two players, according to which one player makes a payment to the other, in exchange for an exogenous service. At each point in time, either player may unilaterally require an adjustment of the contract payment, involving adjustment costs...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261197
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Salience theory of choice under risk
Bordalo, Pedro; Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei - 2010
"We present a theory of choice among lotteries in which the decision maker's attention is drawn to (precisely defined) salient payoffs. This leads the decision maker to a context-dependent representation of lotteries in which true probabilities are replaced by decision weights distorted in favor...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008665197
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Decision-making under the gambler's fallacy : evidence from asylum judges, loan officers, and baseball umpires
Chen, Daniel L.; Moskowitz, Tobias J.; Shue, Kelly - 2016
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011450431
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A Comparison of Regret Theory and Salience Theory for Decisions under Risk
Herweg, Fabian - 2020
Two non-transitive theories to model decision making under risk are regret theory (Loomes and Sugden, 1982, 1987) and salience theory (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer, 2012). While the psychological underpinning of these two approaches is different, the models share the assumption that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012850081
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Does Economic Policy Uncertainty Encourage Gambling? Evidence from the Chinese Welfare Lottery Market
Xu, Can; Steiner, Andreas; de Haan, Jakob - 2023
This paper investigates the effect of economic policy uncertainty (EPU) on gambling activity in China. Based on a … data on lottery sales in Chinese provinces to estimate the short- and long-run effect of EPU on gambling. Our results … suggest that EPU has a significant positive effect on gambling in the short run. In addition, we find that this positive …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014262034
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"A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Childhoof Vaccination Behavior : Nash Versus Kant"
De Donder, Philippe; Llavador, Humberto; Penczynski, Stefan - 2022
Whether or not to vaccinate one’s child is a decision that a parent may approach in several ways. The vaccination game, in which parents must choose whether to vaccinate a child against a disease, is one with positive externalities (herd immunity). In some societies, not vaccinating is an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013308109
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Delegation and Interim Performance Evaluation
Schütte, Miriam; Wichardt, Philipp Christoph - 2013
This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293918
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Bayesian Repeated Games and Reputations
Forges, Francoise; Salomon, Antoine - 2014
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352382