We examine wage competition in a model where identical workers choose the number of jobs to apply for and identical … firms simultaneously post a wage. The Nash equilibrium of this game exhibits the following properties: (i) an equilibrium … where workers apply for just one job exhibits unemployment and absence of wage dispersion; (ii) an equilibrium where workers …

An advantage of collective wage agreement is that search and business-stealing externalities can be internalized. A … heterogeneity and on-the-job search. We compare the most favorable case of a collective wage agreement (i.e. the wage that a planner … would choose under the constraint that all firms in a sector-occupation cell must offer the same wage) with the case without …

max-mean wage differential. The latter measure of wage dispersion is more robust than measures based on the reservation … wage, due to the long left tail of the wage distribution. We estimate this wage differential using data on match quality … and allow for measurement error. The estimated wage dispersion and mismatch for the US is consistent with an unemployment …

network clearing). We show that those frictions and the wage mechanism are in general not independent. Equilibria that exhibit … wage dispersion is inefficient in terms of network formation. Under complete recall (firms can go back and forth between … all their candidates) only wage mechanisms that allow for ex post Bertrand competition generate the maximum matching on a …