provide an explanation of why small countries sometimes exclude certain goods (especially those related to culture) from trade …

gather information on investment projects. The initial owner has two tasks: monitoring the manager and supervising project … choice. Optimality would require a large ownership stake for monitoring but a small stake for not interfering with managerial …. The large shareholder retains full ownership of the firm but monitoring, and the resulting firing policy, are distorted …

. Finally, as an extension, we endogenize intermediation, in the form of monitoring, and show that it may be oversupplied in …

monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager's compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …

the shapes of contracts and the amount of monitoring. Equity-like contracts and excessive monitoring emerge when … principals are able to coordinate monitoring or verify each others? monitoring efforts. When this is not possible, free riding in … monitoring weakens the incentive to monitor, so that flat payments, debt-like contracts and very low levels of monitoring appear …

charge of project selection and the supervisory board is in charge of monitoring. We consider the case in which the large …