This study investigates whether migrants, once they have decided to move to Switzerland, prefer to settle in municipalities that feature low income taxes. In line with the existing literature, results from cluster-specific count data models indicate that income taxes are a significant pull...

A recent Spanish tax reform granted regions the authority to set income tax rates, resulting in substantial tax differentials. We use individual-level information from Social Security records over a period of one decade. Conditional on moving, taxes have a significant effect on location choice....

Public health insurance and other arrangements covering health-costs effectively provide insurance against changes in health status. These arrangements engage in burden-smoothing over the life cycle and entail various elements of redistribution. Lack of portability regarding this type of cover...

We study the nonlinear taxation of internationally mobile workers in general equilibrium. Contrary to conventional wisdom, in general equilibrium, migration lowers the bottom tax rate but raises the top tax rate, making the optimal tax system more progressive and moving tax rates closer to those...

We investigate the consequences of a peaceful shift of power from one social group to another. Theoretically, we show that an individual's decision to stay put or migrate depends on the difference between the political preferences of groups and the change in tax. Empirically, we use the case of...

In this paper we employ a tax-competition model to demonstrate that in the presence of migration the re-distributive advantage of a non-linear income tax system over a linear (flat) one is significantly mitigated relative to the autarky (no-migration) equilibrium. When migration threats are...

Motivated by the process of economic development in Eastern Germany since the German reunification we set up a dynamic macroeconomic model of a small open economy where both capital and labor are mobile and there are increasing returns to scale at the aggregate level. The model features multiple...

We set up a simple model of tax competition for mobile, highly-skilled and overconfident managers. Firms endogenously choose the compensation scheme for managers, which consists of a fixed wage and a bonus payment in the high state. Managers are overconfident about the probability of the high...

We analyze the competition in bonus taxation when banks compensate their managers by means of fixed and incentive pay and bankers are internationally mobile. Banks choose bonus payments that induce excessive managerial risk-taking to maximize their private benefits of existing government bailout...