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Buying Votes and International Organizations : The Dirty Work-Hypothesis

Dreher, Axel - 2019

We show how major shareholders can exploit their power over international organizations to hide their foreign-policy interventions from domestic audiences. We argue that major powers exert influence bilaterally when domestic audiences view the intervention favorably. When domestic audiences are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892255

Mining for Peace

Hodler, Roland; Schaudt, Paul; Vesperoni, Alberto - 2023

The energy transition increases the demand for minerals from ethnically diverse, conflict-prone developing countries. We study whether and where mining is possible in such countries without raising the risk of civil conflict. We proceed in three steps: First, we propose a theoretical model to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014262694

Public Debt and the Political Economy of Reforms

Boyer, Pierre C.; Esslinger, Christoph; Roberson, Brian - 2021

We develop a two-period model of redistributive politics in which two politicians compete in an election in each period. In the first period, the politicians propose both whether to experiment with an efficient reform with uncertain benefits and choose the amount of public debt. Politicians also...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236278

Globalization, Time-Preferences, and Populist Voting

Aronsson, Thomas - 2020

Societies see growing support for populist politicians who advocate an end to globalization. Our behavioral economics model links impatience to voters' appraisals of an income shock due to globalization that is associated with short-run costs and delayed gains. The model shows that impatient...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826005

The costs of favoritism: Is politically-driven aid less effective?

Dreher, Axel; Klasen, Stephan; Vreeland, James Raymond; … - 2010

World Bank projects and generally find that projects that are potentially politically motivated - such as those granted to … governments holding a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council or an Executive Directorship at the World Bank … Council members with higher short-term debt, however, a negative quality rating is more likely. So we find evidence that World …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010332994

Foreign Influence and Domestic Policy : A Survey

Aidt, Toke - 2019

In an interconnected world, economic and political interests inevitably reach beyond national borders. Since policy …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012889683

Rational Drivers and the Choice between Congestion Tolls and Tradeable Permits : A Political Economy Model

De Borger, Bruno L.; Glazer, Amihai; Proost, Stef - 2021

People who anticipate the introduction of a policy can adapt their behavior, perhaps in ways that make the policy ineffective and exacerbate the problem to be addressed. This paper develops a political economy model to study strategic behavior related to the introduction of congestion policies,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013250739

Do Party Positions Affect the Public's Policy Preferences?

Grewenig, Elisabeth - 2019

The standard assumption of exogenous policy preferences implies that parties set their positions according to their voters’ preferences. We investigate the reverse effect: Are the electorates’ policy preferences responsive to party positions? In a representative German survey, we inform...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012889176

Dynamic Fiscal Competition : A Political Economy Theory

Arcalean, Calin - 2019

I develop a political economy theory of dynamic fiscal competition via public spending and debt. With internationally mobile capital, strategic policies generate two cross-border externalities that voters in each country fail to internalize: (1) an increase in public spending that bolsters...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891564

Collective Emotions and Protest Vote

Altomonte, Carlo - 2019

We leverage on important findings in social psychology to build a behavioral theory of protest vote. An individual develops a feeling of resentment if she loses income over time while richer people do not, or if she does not gain as others do, i.e. when her relative deprivation increases. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892125