In the context of international tax coordination incomplete information is one of the well-known frictions that can … lead to bargaining failure and might explain a lack of observed coordination. We consider international negotiations about … tax coordination under complete and incomplete information. We identify the conditions for multilateral negotiations to be …

The use of tax havens by multinational corporations (MNCs) has attracted increasing attention and scrutiny in recent … limits can be attributed to nontax frictions (such as the legal and business environment in different jurisdictions), to tax … law provisions limiting profit shifting, and to the costs of tax planning. There is evidence consistent with the relevance …

the importance of the actual tax rate. For Japan, which charges a higher tax rate on corporate profits than Germany, we … imposes a lower tax rate than Germany, the switch to territorial taxation is not found to exert any significant effects on …

corporate income tax variable. Our paper is among the few to date to take spatial linkages with respect to FDI into account. The …

Did multinational production (MP) exacerbate or mitigate the collapse of international trade during the Great Recession …. The MP links significantly amplified the impact of these shocks on the rest of the world, which had a much greater impact …

In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one … or both countries are Kantians in Roemer’s sense. Kantians are shown to choose a higher tax rate than Nashians for any … given tax rate of the other country, which indicates that they seek to mitigate the (Nashian) race to the bottom. We avoid …

If countries anticipate Bertrand competition in tax rates, they may expend effort that makes some of their tax payers … less mobile or increases the mobility of tax payers elsewhere. I provide piecemeal evidence on what activities countries … use. I analyse how such activities interact with Bertrand tax competition if the size of the group of loyal and non …