stylized facts by setting up a simple two-country model of tax competition with heterogeneous firms. In this model a unique … simultaneous expansion of both markets intensifies tax competition and causes both countries to reduce their tax rates, despite …

We introduce tax competition for mobile labor into an optimal-taxation model with two skill levels. We analyze a … symmetric subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the game between two governments and two taxpayer populations. Tax competition …

extends Keen's (2001) analysis of symmetric capital tax competition under preferential (or discriminatory) and non … model: it lowers the average rate of capital taxation and thus makes tax competition more aggressive in both the large and …

standard tax competition model for capital-enhancing technology, royalty payments, and profit shifting, this paper suggests a … Pareto-efficient solution under coordination and the unilaterally optimal policy under competition for mobile capital. In the …

In a two-country economy we analyze how tax competition differs from the standard all-Nashian tax competition, if one … all-Kantian tax competition is efficient and that the inefficient race to the bottom is weakened in economies with a … such that the inefficient all-Nashian tax competition results …

I develop a political economy theory of dynamic fiscal competition via public spending and debt. With internationally …

This paper explores the effects of fiscal competition on local land use. A theoretical analysis considers the tradeoff …, reduces these incentives. Based on the theoretical analysis, the effect of fiscal competition on commercial and residential … the exposure to fiscal competition, I exploit institutional characteristics of the system of fiscal equalization to which …

underreporting, the equilibrium under tax competition may still be constrained-efficient (in the sense that there is no scope for … well. We conclude that commonly held assumptions on the need for coordination under tax competition need to be revised or …