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traditional procurement (TP) and public-private partnership (PPP). We show that a mixed regime, in which TP is used in one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892139
Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient … allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex … post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249652
experience demand shocks derived from a lottery-based assignment of public procurement contracts for construction services in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347985
preferences of 900+ real-world public procurement officials in Finland and Germany. This is an important pursuit as they report … importance of multiple features of procurement outcomes. Officials prioritize avoiding unexpectedly high prices but not seeking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014263185
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261291
We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908650
We consider a labor market with search frictions in which workers make multiple applications and firms can post and commit to general mechanisms that may be conditioned both on the number of applications received and on the number of offers received by its candidate. When the contract space...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861466
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231973
In recent years, a significant problem with the carbon credit market has been the higher than initially predicted price volatility. It is essential to study the market in a repeated-period dynamic setting to identify the factors enabling high fluctuations in prices. In this paper, we examine the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013214329
Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244245