Showing 1 - 10 of 618
Unlike standard auctions, we show that competitive procurement may optimally limit competition or use inefficient … allocation rules that award the project to a less efficient firm with positive probability. Procurement projects often involve ex … post moral hazard after the competitive process is over. A procurement mechanism must combine an incentive scheme with the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013249652
traditional procurement (TP) and public-private partnership (PPP). We show that a mixed regime, in which TP is used in one …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892139
We investigate the impact of public procurement spending on business survival. Using Italy as a laboratory, we … public contract data. Employing a regression discontinuity design for close-call procurement auctions, we find that winners …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014240867
preferences of 900+ real-world public procurement officials in Finland and Germany. This is an important pursuit as they report … importance of multiple features of procurement outcomes. Officials prioritize avoiding unexpectedly high prices but not seeking …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014263185
experience demand shocks derived from a lottery-based assignment of public procurement contracts for construction services in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347985
In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This invites corruption. We propose a model of corruption in which the auctioneer orchestrates bid rigging by inviting a bidder to either lower or raise his bid, whichever is more profitable. We characterize equilibrium bidding in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261291
We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014077334
We study the relative performance of the first‐price sealed‐bid auction and the second-price sealed‐bid auction in a laboratory experiment where bidders can signal information through their bidding behaviour to an outside observer. We consider two different information settings: the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012908650
Researchers frequently use variants of the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak (BDM) mechanism to elicit willingness to pay (WTP). These variants involve numerous incentive-irrelevant design choices, some of which carry advantages for implementation but may deteriorate participant comprehension or trust in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013244245
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231973