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On the Preferred Creditor Status of Multilateral Development Banks
Amegashie, J. Atsu - 2023
The loans of the IMF, World Bank, and other multilateral development banks (MDBs) are excluded from debt restructuring. This is the result of their preferred creditor status. There are two justifications for the preferred creditor status of MDBs: (a) they give concessional loans, and (b) they...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014347019
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China and the World Bank - How Contrasting Development Approaches Affect the Stability of African States
Gehring, Kai - 2019
China's development model challenges the approaches of traditional Western donors like the World Bank. We argue that both aim at stability, but differ in the norms propagated to achieve that. Using fixed effects and IV estimations, we analyze a broad range of subnational stability measures in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012861418
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China and the World Bank : How Contrasting Development Approaches Affect the Stability of African States
Gehring, Kai; Kaplan, Lennart C.; Wong, Melvin H.L - 2019
China’s development model challenges the approaches of traditional, Western donors like the World Bank. We argue that both aim at stability, but differ in the norms propagated to achieve that. Using fixed effects and IV estimations, we analyze a broad range of subnational stability measures in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033178
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Lobbying and Compromise
Epstein, Gil S.; Nitzan, Shmuel - 2005
The compromise enhancing effect of lobbying on public policy has been established in two typical settings. In the first … demonstrate that in the latter setting, the compromising effect of lobbying need not exist. Our reduced-form, two-stage public …) desires to suckle thereby threatening the public well being more than the lobbying interest groups. The main result specifies …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261146
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Reforming legislatures : is one house better than two?
Facchini, Giovanni; Testa, Cecilia - 2009
During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we propose a theoretical framework casting some lights on the drawbacks of bicameral state legislatures and on the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms. In a setting where lawmakers...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273815
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Voting, lobbying, and the decentralization theorem
Lockwood, Benjamin - 2007
lobbying, because now decisions are too sensitive to the preferences of the organised group. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275667
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Can lobbying encourage abatement? Designing a new policy instrument
Lange, Ian A.; Polborn, Sarah - 2012
Taking a political economy perspective this paper proposes an alternative carbon abatement policy instrument with significant advantages over existing policy instruments. The key feature of the proposed carbon securities is that they entitle their owners to a fixed proportion of ex ante unknown...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281453
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How a firm can induce legislators to adopt a bad policy
Dahm, Matthias; Dur, Robert; Glazer, Amihai - 2012
This paper shows why a majority of legislators may vote for a policy that benefits a firm but harms all legislators. The firm may induce legislators to support the policy by suggesting that it is more likely to invest in a district whose voters or representative support the policy. In...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281930
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Natural Disasters, Moral Hazard, and Special Interests in Congress
Kaplan, Carol - 2019
We exploit the precise timing of natural disasters to provide empirical evidence on the connection between electoral accountability and politicians’ support for special interests. We show that, in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, the evening news substantially reduce their coverage of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892175
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Who Lobbies Whom? Special Interests and Hired Guns
Ellis, Christopher J. - 2019
“informational lobbying market” and can be easily incentivized by policymakers to truthfully reveal private information. We also show …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012892218