Showing 1 - 10 of 656
infinite-horizon learning, and subjective expectations with Euler-equation learning. Under rational expectations, the model … necessitates of large, possibly unrealistically so, degrees of myopia. The same result persists under infinite-horizon learning …, given that agents are still remarkably farsighted. But, under Euler-equation learning, the model can fit the data with only …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013229788
The adaptive learning approach has been fruitfully employed to model the formation of aggregate expectations at the … macroeconomic level, as an alternative to rational expectations. This paper uses adaptive learning to understand, instead, the … sentiment, defined as the degrees of excess optimism and pessimism that cannot be justified by the near-rational learning model …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012831652
We experimentally study settings where an individual may have an incentive to adopt negative beliefs about another’s intentions in order to justify egoistic behavior. Our first study uses a game in which a player can take money from an opponent in order to prevent the opponent from...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012891985
study experimentally to what extent cross-game learning can reduce overbidding in SPAs, taking into account cognitive skills … losses from high bids are more salient than in SPAs. Experience in FPAs causes substantial cross-game learning for … bid shading by cognitively more able participants, resulting in lower profits in FPAs. Thus, cross-game learning has the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013314693
This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293918
We study optimal selling strategies of a seller who is poorly informed about the buyer’s value for the object. When the maxmin seller only knows that the mean of the distribution of the buyer’s valuations belongs to some interval then nature can keep him to payoff zero no matter how much...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011307115
Under appropriate assumptions (private values and uniform punishments), the Nash equilibria of a Bayesian repeated game without discounting are payoff-equivalent to tractable, completely revealing, equilibria and can be achieved as interim cooperative solutions of the initial Bayesian game. This...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010352382
We perform a (psychological) game-theoretic analysis of cheating in the setting proposed by Fischbacher & Föllmi-Heusi (2013). The key assumption, which we refer to as perceived cheating aversion, is that the decision maker derives disutility in proportion to the amount in which he is perceived...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011584907
We study equilibrium reporting behavior in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) type cheating games when agents have a fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011615902
I model the strategic interaction between scientists aiming for promotion and a research institution that seeks a highly productive faculty by setting a maternity allowance in the form of a minimum promotion standard. The model shows that maternity allowances need not derive from moral justice...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018181