one team increases social good production by selectively attracting and coordinating motivated agents. We test this … prediction in a lab experiment allowing us to cleanly separate the selection effect from other effects of low incentives. Results … show that social good production more than doubles in the low-incentive team, but only if self-selection is possible. Our …

We analyze linear, weakest-link and best-shot public goods games in which a distinguished team member, the team … allocator, has property rights over the benefits from the public good and can distribute them among team members. These team … exist in work teams. Our results show that the introduction of a team allocator leads to pronounced cooperation in both …

In this paper we present results from a large scale real effort experiment in an online labor market investigating the …

exploiting the introduction of performance pay in German academia as a natural experiment. Using data encompassing the universe …

We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. We allow for asymmetries in winning … prizes and marginal costs of effort; and we characterize the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe … by the owner of the other team and (ii) she accepts the bribe. We show that these conditions depend on the ratios of …