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We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013231973
We analyze strategic leaks due to spying out a rival’s bid in a first-price auction. Such leaks induce sequential bidding, complicated by the fact that the spy may be a counterspy who serves the interests of the spied at bidder and reports strategically distorted information. This ambiguity...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012582084
characteristic function, derived from the partition form game, is not empty. As an application, we study collusion in auctions in …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010273875
Traditional economic theory of collusion assumed that cartels are inherently unstable, and yet some manage to operate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013427700
sanctions on communication reinforces the direct cartel-deterring effect of sanctions as collusion is more difficult to reach …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013470283
constrained. We show that collusion sustainability is non-monotonic in the size of the capacity constrained firm, which has little …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014290080
antitrust authorities in each market. We are concerned with how the sustainability of collusion in one local market is affected … by the existence of collusion in other markets when they are linked by demand relationships. The interdependence of … collusion sustainability across markets leads to potential externalities in antitrust enforcement across jurisdictions. As a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010274002
, collusion. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011388208
We investigate the effect of a ban on third-degree price discrimination on the sustainability of collusion. We build a …’ discount factor has to be higher in order to sustain collusion in grim-trigger strategies under price discrimination than under …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011451402
We analyze spying out a rival’s price in a Bertrand market game with incomplete information. Spying transforms a simultaneous into a robust sequential moves game. We provide conditions for profitable espionage. The spied at firm may attempt to immunize against spying by delaying its pricing...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012018167