derive the optimal contract for both experimentation and production when the agent has private information about his … efficiency in experimentation. This private information in the experimentation stage generates asymmetric information in the … asymmetric information is endogenously determined by the length of the experimentation stage. An optimal contract uses the length …

We investigate whether the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in a large election with three …. With two alternatives and strategic voters, the simple plurality rule aggregates information efficiently in elections with …

appropriate information provision enhances efficiency. We discuss extensions of the model and argue that subsidies may be a … property of a signalling equilibrium to overcome credibility problems in information provision. In addition we point out … possible problems with overreaction to public information. Furthermore, we suggest a new focus for development policy. …

A rational-expectations equilibrium with positive demand for financial information does exist under fully revealing … average portfolio demand information in equilibrium if they can adjust portfolio size. More information diminishes the … endowments strongly differ from the average portfolio are worse off. Under fully revealing price, information market equilibria …

is privately informed about the true state of the world. When n = 1, full information revelation never occurs in … equilibrium and the only information transmission happens in the first period. With n > 1 the outcome depends both on the … structure of the sellers? information and, even more importantly, on the intensity of competition allowed by the trading rules …