Existing theories of a firm's optimal capital structure seem to fail in explaining why many healthy and profitable firms rely heavily on equity financing, even though benefits associated with debt (like tax shields) appear to be high and the bankruptcy risk low. This holds in particular for...

This paper examines a dynamic game of exploitation of a common pool of some renewable asset by agents that sell the result of their exploitation on an oligopolistic market. A Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium of the game is used to analyze the effects of a merger of a subset of the agents. We...

Output-based allocations (OBAs) are typically used in emission trading schemes to mitigate leakage in sectors at risk. Recent work has shown they may also help to stabilize prices in markets subject to supply and demand shocks. We extend previous work to simultaneously include both leakage and...

This article examines the role of the interaction between product market and labor market imperfections in determining total factor productivity growth (TFPG). Embedding Dobbelaere and Mairesse's (2009) generalization of Hall's (1990) approach, allowing for the possibility that wages are...

This study investigates the impact of firm-specific discount factors on merger formation and market performance. We estimate firm-specific discount factors for 228 publicly traded and privately held firms operating in the semiconductor market and apply a heterogeneous treatment effects model...

Two main approaches have been implemented in regional CO2 markets to address competitiveness and carbon leakage: output based allocation (Australia, California, New Zealand) and capacity based allocation (EU). This paper characterizes the best policy, given that auctioning with border adjustment...

This paper considers the effects of an interim performance evaluation on the decision of a principal to delegate authority to a potentially biased but better informed agent. Assuming the agents’ outside option to be determined by market beliefs about their type, interim evaluations (a) provide...

This paper experimentally examines the selection of equilibria in dynamic games. Our baseline treatment is a two-state extension of an indefinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma, which we modify in series of treatments to study the focality of efficiency and symmetry, the effect dynamic and...

This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable...

When the repeated prisoner's dilemma setup is generalized to allow for a unilateral breakup, maximal efficiency in equilibrium remains an open question. With restrictions of simple symmetry with eternal mutual cooperation, defection, or (matched) alternation on the equilibrium path, we describe...