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Fairness and the optimal allocation of ownership rights

Fehr, Ernst; Kremhelmer, Susanne; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2005

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261192

Contracts, fairness, and incentives

Fehr, Ernst; Klein, Alexander; Schmidt, Klaus M. - 2004

We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on both the actual and the optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Explicit incentive contracts that are optimal according to self-interest theory become inferior when some agents value fairness. Conversely,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261212

Pre-Play Communication with Forgone Costly Messages: Experimental Evidence on Forward Induction

Blume, Andreas; Kriss, Peter H.; Weber, Roberto A. - 2016

coordination is difficult without a communication option but obtains regularly with mandatory costless pre-play messages. We find … coordination can occur with similar frequency as under costless communication. These findings can be accounted for by …We experimentally study optional costly communication in Stag-Hunt games. Prior research demonstrates that efficient …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011522458

What You See is All There Is

Enke, Benjamin - 2020

News reports and communication are inherently constrained by space, time, and attention. As a result, news sources …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012840217

Selling favors in the lab: experiments on campaign finance reform

Houser, Daniel; Stratmann, Thomas - 2006

Substantial academic interest and public policy debate centers on campaign finance reform. Campaign resources can provide benefits to constituencies if candidates use them to fund the distribution of useful information. On the other hand, voters can potentially be harmed if candidates trade...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263918

The chopstick auction: a study of the exposure problem in multi-unit auctions

Englmaier, Florian; Guillén, Pablo; Llorente, Loreto; … - 2006

Multi-unit auctions are sometimes plagued by the so-called exposure problem. In this paper, we analyze a simple game called the chopstick auction' in which bidders are confronted with the exposure problem. We do so both in theory and in a laboratory experiment. In theory, the chopstick auction...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263964

Institutions and contract enforcement

Falk, Armin; Huffman, David; MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2008

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions - dismissal barriers, and bonus pay - affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264349

Exploring higher-order risk effects

Deck, Cary; Schlesinger, Harris - 2008

Higher-order risk effects play an important role in examining economic behavior under uncertainty. A precautionary demand for saving has been linked to the property of prudence and the property of temperance has been used to show how the presence of an unavoidable risk affects one's behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010264510

Incentives and anonymity principle : crowding out toward users

Crifo, Patricia; Rullière, Jean-Louis - 2004

In our model, an agent produces an outcome by a costly effort and then distributes it among heterogeneous users. The agent's payoff is the weighted sum of the users? shares and the coefficient reflecting their heterogeneity. When the agent neglects users? heterogeneity the game leads to an...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010276426

Reputations, relationships and the enforcement of incomplete contracts

MacLeod, W. Bentley - 2006

This paper discusses the literature on the enforcement of incomplete contracts. It compares legal enforcement to enforcement via relationships and reputations. A number of mechanisms, such as the repeat purchase mechanism (Klein and Leffler (1981)) and efficiency wages (Shapiro and Stiglitz...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263921

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